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The threat of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) disasters is 
one of the most dangerous threats to the homeland. The United States has an opportunity 
to harness emerging technology to increase responder safety and improve situational 
awareness for civil authorities during response to natural or manmade CBRN disasters. 
This thesis explores the possibility of integrating small, unmanned aircraft systems 
(sUAS) with video capability and CBRN detection and identification sensors for use by 
National Guard civil support teams.  
Existing policy and doctrine are insufficient to accommodate the fielding of such 
a capability. This thesis identifies and discusses these gaps. This thesis also conducts an 
analysis of similar Department of Defense and other national UAS policy and programs 
and offers recommendations to implement a new domestic sUAS policy. The 
recommendations provide the framework for implementing an innovative technology 
while addressing complicated issues, such as national airspace system integration, 
intelligence oversight, and training programs.  
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The emergence of small unmanned aircraft systems (sUAS) has created an 
opportunity to transform disaster response in the homeland. This technology can provide 
increased situational awareness (SA) for civil authorities as well as remote air monitoring 
for the incident commander to enable more educated decisions, which results in safer, 
more effective response to disasters. The Department of Defense (DOD) is in an ideal 
position to facilitate this capability by equipping the National Guard’s weapons of mass 
destruction—civil support teams (WMD-CSTs or CSTs) with sUAS capable of detecting 
and identifying chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear (CBRN) and hazardous 
material (HAZMAT) materials, as well as providing video to the incident commander. 
One of the primary benefits of providing this capability to the CSTs is to capitalize on its 
nationwide response capability, which makes this technology accessible to every 
community throughout the United States and its territories.  
This thesis is a policy proposal intended to provide the DOD with 
recommendations about how to incorporate sUAS into domestic operations by revising 
current sUAS policy, generating new policy to address the new mission, and integrating it 
into the national airspace system (NAS). Current DOD sUAS policy and doctrine do not 
address domestic sUAS operations outside of special use airspace. Additionally, current 
doctrine is written for fixed wing sUAS rather than vertical takeoff and landing (VTOL) 
aircraft. This new capability requires thorough analysis to ensure all legal aspects of 
policy and doctrine align with domestic-specific issues, such as Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA) integration and state/federal legislation constraints.  
This thesis is limited to policy analysis and does not address specific technology 
or translate data analysis into technological requirements. The combination of sUAS and 
wireless air monitoring technology is a new concept, thus the availability of open source 
technological information is limited. There are opportunities for future analysis in the 
research and development of this capability as well as future force structure revisions, 
which may arise as a result of a robust training and sustainment program. Additionally, 
further research into Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 107 is 
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necessary to determine specific operator training and certification requirements and how 
those will be nested into DOD operations. The limitations of future sUAS capabilities are 
limited only by the imagination. Future sUAS could include capabilities such as 
autonomous flight, all weather operations, as well as more advanced sensors and 
cameras. However, the intent of this proposal, utilizing current FAA policy as a 
framework, is to provide a useful framework for implementing a program with 
technology that is currently available on the commercial market or requires minimal 
research and development. 
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Emerging technology combining sUAS platforms and wireless CBRN detection 
sensors provides an opportunity for the DOD to develop a capability that can transform 
response to disasters within the United States. This thesis explores the feasibility of 
integrating sUAS equipped with video and CBRN sensor technologies into the equipment 
of DOD civil support teams for use in support of civil authorities during domestic 
incidents. These threats can be natural or manmade, intentional, or unintentional, and 
include both terrorist attacks and HAZMAT incidents. One of the DOD’s primary 
objectives in its mission to protect the homeland is to maintain the ability to support civil 
authorities during domestic CBRN events.1 According to the Strategy for Homeland 
Security and Defense Support of Civil Authorities, “DOD will continue to improve 
CBRN force posturing and refine force sourcing processes to meet future national 
requirements for domestic CBRN incident response.”2 The use of sUAS equipped with 
wireless CBRN sensors would increase responder safety by maximizing the standoff 
distance between responders and contamination zones as well as improve situational 
awareness for incident commanders during all disaster responses.  
Current DOD domestic UAS policy and doctrine are insufficient to support sUAS 
for several reasons. First, current DOD UAS policy restricts use to case-by-case 
                                                 
1 Department of Defense, Strategy for Homeland Security and Defense Support of Civil Authorities 
(Washington DC: Department of Defense, 2013), 15.  
2 Ibid.  
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operations approved by the secretary of defense (SecDef), or in the event of a search and 
rescue, the Northern Command (NORTHCOM) commander has approval authority. This 
level of approval is unrealistic if domestic response teams need to use the capability 
immediately. Second, current domestic UAS policy does not consider VTOL sUAS. This 
is understandable since the technology has not been fielded, but VTOL sUAS policies 
must be addressed prior to implementation. Integration into the NAS will require 
significant policy implementation. Third, current DOD sUAS doctrine contains gaps 
addressing the unique challenges associated with defense support to civil authorities 
(DSCA) operations, such as intelligence oversight (IO), airspace limitations, and state 
legislation. This thesis conducts an analysis of current DOD UAS doctrine as well as 
domestic UAS policy and offers solutions to integrate this capability into civil support 
teams.  
B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
The primary goal of this research is to determine how the DOD can support civil 
authorities with a revolutionary sUAS technology that can provide additional situational 
awareness, remote CBRN/HAZMAT detection and identification, and ultimately increase 
safety for all personnel involved in a disaster response. Secondary questions include: 
• What policy barriers must be overcome to authorize the use of DOD sUAS 
in the domestic environment? 
• What legal barriers must be overcome to integrate sUAS into the national 
airspace system? 
• What training objectives must be met to ensure compliance with 
applicable law and the challenges listed above? 
C. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH 
The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) assessed current capabilities and 
noted key goals that were of the “highest priority” for future support to civil authorities. 
Two of the four priorities are 1) “Accelerate the development of standoff 
radiological/nuclear detection capabilities, and 2) Enhance capabilities for domain 
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awareness.”3 sUAS can accomplish both of these priorities. This thesis seeks to capitalize 
on the DOD’s mission to support civil authorities during disaster response. It offers an 
idea that could transform civil response to dangerous CBRN and HAZMAT events by 
utilizing existing DOD force structure as well as existing sUAS doctrine as a foundation. 
Adoption of this proposal and use of sUAS in the CST could make this capability 
accessible to every community in the United States and its territories.  
The author is the commander of the Nevada National Guard’s 92nd WMD-CST 
as well as a rotary wing aviator and is in an ideal position not only to understand the 
benefits this technology could provide to CSTs and civil authorities, but also how to 
integrate it into the NAS. Acceptance of this proposal could further unify the relationship 
between civil authorities and the DOD by providing a revolutionary capability aimed at 
increasing responder safety.  
D. METHODOLOGY 
This thesis explores the theoretical application of an emerging technology 
(CBRN-sensing sUAS with remote video capability). Research suggests that the DOD is 
currently developing the technology for overseas operations; however, there is no 
literature to indicate this capability is being considered for domestic operations.4 The 
integration of this technology into domestic operations will require significant changes to 
current DOD domestic unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) policy and is based on the 
identification of an opportunity to improve the safety of civil authorities and increase the 
situational awareness for incident commanders. The reason for focusing on DOD policy 
rather than commercial aviation policy is twofold.  
First, DOD policy is standard across the country. If a successful technology can 
be implemented across the DOD, it will be easier for other public agencies to adopt 
similar policies and utilize similar equipment. A well-researched policy analysis can 
provide useful data for any public agency to adopt for its own use. 
                                                 
3 Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Washington DC: Department of 
Defense, 2010), 19–20.  
4 Steve Johnson, “Come Fly with Me…,” CBRNe World (Spring 2010): 79–81.  
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Second, the decision to focus on CSTs is due to the mission of that organization. 
The civil support team is the National Guard’s primary CBRN response organization. Its 
mission is to “identify, assess, advise and assist incident commanders during intentional 
and unintentional CBRN incidents as well as natural or manmade disasters resulting in 
potential loss of life or property.”5 Each state has at least one CST capable of 24/7 
response anywhere in the state. Additionally, the CST is a federally funded organization 
dedicated to supporting civil authorities, and one is provided at no cost to the requesting 
organization.6 If this sUAS capability is integrated into these teams, every community in 
the United States will have access to this technology at no cost to the requesting agency. 
This policy analysis determines whether existing DOD and national policy and doctrine 
are sufficient to support sUAS equipped with a video camera and CBRN sensors for use 
in DSCA. Additionally, this policy analysis explores how existing frameworks can be 
used to support a capability that does not yet exist.  
The research is conducted in three parts. The first part is focused on setting the 
stage for understanding the CST, the WMD/CBRN threat, and how this capability can 
improve life safety and increase situational awareness. It is important to understand what 
the CST is, its mission, its role in DSCA, and how this sUAS concept is nested into 
national and DOD strategic guidance for disaster response. Moreover, it provides a brief 
historical review of international WMD attacks as well as major disasters. This review is 
intended to highlight the WMD threat and provide examples of disasters that could or did 
benefit from sUAS technology.  
The second part of the research conducts an analysis of existing policy and 
doctrine as well as gaps in policy. Since the DOD does not use domestic VTOL sUAS 
technology, there is no precedent for comparison. Instead, the research looks into the 
existing framework of DOD domestic UAS policy to identify areas that could support 
sUAS and the gaps that would need to be addressed to make it successful. Significant 
topics that provide the foundation for existing policy include intelligence oversight, 
                                                 
5 National Guard Bureau, Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Team Management (NGR 500-
3/ANGI 10-2503) (Arlington, VA: National Guard Bureau, 2011), 2. 
6 Ibid., 2.  
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national airspace integration, authorized mission sets, and approval authority. Moreover, 
these topics are explored in detail to determine their role in current policy and what gaps 
exist in relation to a sUAS program. Additional topics that are part of this research 
include training and procurement. 
The third part of this research provides a conclusion and recommendations to 
policy and doctrine. The implementation of sUAS for use in DSCA requires 
comprehensive revision of multiple layers of policy and will likely involve approval at 
the secretary of defense level due to the sensitive nature of sUAS in the United States. 
Finally, these recommendations provide a framework for policy revision by offering 
specific solutions to bridge the gap between existing and future policy.  
E. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The review of the literature focuses on the feasibility of a revised DOD policy 
incorporating sUAS with video capability and remote CBRN sensors for use by National 
Guard WMD-CSTs. Research indicates the concept of using sUAS equipped with CBRN 
sensors for DOD domestic operations has been discussed, but it is still in the very early 
stages of development. Although there is literature addressing sUAS and separate 
literature addressing remote CBRN sensors, literature addressing the combination of the 
two is limited. Repeated attempts to obtain research data on such systems from the 
commercial and private sectors were unsuccessful, likely due to the sensitive nature of 
intellectual property. This thesis conducts a synthesis of the available literature between 
the two concepts and explores the policy options for integrating them into a resource for 
the DOD. The objective is to improve response to domestic disasters by improving safety 
and increasing situational awareness as well as providing a valuable capability to every 
community in the United States. The literature underpinning this research can be broken 
down into four themes: 1) national strategy, 2) Department of Defense policy, 3) federal 
government policy, and 4) private sector research 
1. National Strategy 
U.S. national strategy provides the guidance to continuously strive for 
improvement in the realm of CBRN response. Literature published by federal 
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government agencies, such as the Office of the President of the United States, the 
Department of Homeland Security, the Congressional Research Service, and the 
Department of Defense, provide the background for the CBRN threat and the need to 
continuously improve our CBRN detection and response capability. The president’s 2015 
National Security Strategy provides clear guidance concerning remaining at the forefront 
of technology, combatting terrorism, and preventing weapons of mass destruction.7 
Additionally, Homeland Security Presidential Directive-8 (HSPD-8) establishes guidance 
to develop an all-hazards preparedness goal.8 This goal is outlined in the National 
Preparedness Guidelines and complements the National Security Strategy by establishing 
national preparedness priorities, one of which is to “Strengthen CBRNE Detection, 
Response, and Decontamination Capabilities.”9  
Further guidance for continued CBRN response capabilities can be found in the 
Strategy for Homeland Defense and Defense Support of Civil Authorities. This document 
provides the framework for the DOD’s two primary missions in support of civil 
authorities and accompanying objectives to achieve the missions. One of those objectives 
is to “maintain defense preparedness for domestic CBRN incidents.”10  
The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review lays the foundation for continued pursuit 
of new technology. It outlines several key initiatives resulting from an assessment of 
future priorities.11 These key initiatives provide the necessary guidance to continuously 
evaluate current capabilities and develop new strategies to improve response protocol. 
These initiatives include: 1) providing “faster, more flexible consequence management 
response forces,” 2) “enhance capabilities for domain awareness,” and 3) “accelerate the 
                                                 
7 White House, National Security Strategy (Washington, DC: White House, 2015).  
8 White House, Homeland Security Presidential Directive / HSPD-8 (Washington, DC: White House, 
2011), http://fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/hspd-8.html.  
9 Department of Homeland Security, National Preparedness Guidelines (Washington DC: Department 
of Homeland Security, 2007), 18. 
10 Department of Defense, Strategy for Homeland Security, 15. 
11 Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review, 19–20.  
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development of standoff radiological/nuclear detection capabilities.”12 These key 
initiatives are precisely what this policy analysis hopes to achieve. 
2. Department of Defense Policy and Literature 
An analysis of existing DOD policy provides a useful framework from which a 
comprehensive UAS program can be developed. This literature covers several aspects of 
existing policy such as the domestic use of large UAS, overseas use of fixed wing sUAS, 
intelligence oversight and the legality of domestic imagery, and training. Additionally, 
DOD literature provides the basis for the concept of the National Guard WMD-CST, its 
mission, and its role in defense support to civil authorities. Conversely, a thorough 
analysis of DOD policy and literature highlights the lack of policy or literature addressing 
the concept of domestic VTOL sUAS and how they can be utilized to support civil 
authorities.  
Existing DOD domestic UAS policy guidance can be found in deputy secretary of 
defense’s (DEPSECDEF) Policy Memorandum 15-002, Guidance for the Domestic Use 
of Unmanned Aircraft Systems. This policy memorandum outlines the authorized use of 
DOD UAS as well as the approval criteria for domestic use. In addition, it also provides 
guidance on considerations while operating DOD UAS, such as intelligence oversight 
and national airspace integration. It is noteworthy that there is no mention of small UAS 
in this memorandum; therefore, its use is limited to understanding the framework 
supporting the existing domestic UAS program.13 
Current training, flight proficiency/currency requirements, and flight rules fall 
under the purview of the Rapid Action Revision to Unmanned Aircraft System Flight 
Regulations (AR 95-23). AR 95-23 establishes guidance for the use of all Army sUAS.14 
It applies to all personnel operating Army UAS including active Army, National Guard, 
Reserves, and Department of the Army civilian and contract personnel. It serves as a 
                                                 
12 Ibid.  
13 Deputy Secretary of Defense, Guidance for the Domestic Use of Unmanned Aircraft Systems, Policy 
memorandum 15-002 (Washington DC: Department of Defense, 2015).  
14 Department of the Army, Rapid Action Revision to Unmanned Aircraft System Flight Regulations 
(AR 95-23) (Washington DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2006), i.  
 9 
reference for all sUAS operations but is limited in its scope. Moreover, it is intended for 
the management of tactical sUAS programs rather than domestic response units. 
Additionally, the regulation does not address VTOL systems discussed in this thesis. 
However, it does address nonstandard sUAS, which applies to sUAS that are not part of 
the Army inventory.15 This regulation provides useful information regarding the 
acquisition and use of nonstandard aircraft.  
Unmanned Aircraft System Commander’s Guide and Training Manual (ATM) 
(Training Circular [TC] 3-04.61) is used to determine proper training and standardization 
programs. This ATM is the “how to” source for performing aircrew duties.16 The ATM 
also provides task, conditions, standards, and description of each authorized maneuver for 
UAS. However, this TC is limited in scope because it deals with fixed wing UAS and is 
limited to training for combat missions; however, it will be useful when discussing the 
training strategy for a future VTOL sUAS program.  
Intelligence oversight is an instrumental component of a successful domestic 
sUAS program. It is the DOD’s program of record based on the Fourth Amendment to 
“ensure all US persons are secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures.”17 The 1981 Executive Order 12333, United States 
Intelligence Activities, prevents the surveillance of persons without approval from the 
head of the agency and the attorney general.18 This applies to all persons subject to U.S. 
surveillance. In 1982, the Department of Defense went a step further and published DOD 
regulation Procedures Governing the Activities of DOD Intelligence Components That 
Affect United States Persons (DOD 5240.1-R).19 This regulation “set forth procedures 
governing the activities of DOD intelligence components that affect United States 
                                                 
15 Ibid., 25.   
16 Department of the Army, UAS Commander’s Guide and Aircrew Training Manual (TC 3-04.61) 
(Washington DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2014), viii.  
17 Fourth Amendment of the Bill of Rights.  
18 Exec. Order No. 12333, 3 CRF (1981).  
19 Department of Defense, Procedures Governing the Activities of DOD Intelligence Components That 
Affect United States Persons, DOD 5240.1R (Washington DC: Department of Defense, 1982), 1.  
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persons.”20 The policy outlined in this regulation establishes the legal framework for the 
intelligence oversight program. Additionally, DOD 5240.1-R mandates that all 
telecommunications regarding national security be secure to ensure authenticity.21 
Although this mandate specifically refers to “telecommunications,” a logical argument 
can be made that video and sensor signals generated from aerial systems must be secure 
as well.  
Specific intelligence guidance regarding the National Guard can be found in Chief 
National Guard Bureau Manual (CNGBM) 2000.01, National Guard Intelligence 
Activities. This document outlines the requirements for collecting, retaining, and 
disseminating information on US persons, which units are authorized to collect this 
information, and by what means. Additionally, CNGBM 2000.01 outlines the criteria for 
determining the need for a proper use memorandum (PUM) and the process for 
submission. This information is important because domestic sUAS use within the DOD 
will require a PUM.22 
The weapons of mass destruction-civil support team is a resource that is not 
widely understood outside of the DOD. National Guard Regulation (NGR) 500-3/Air 
National Guard Instruction (ANGI) 10-2503, Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support 
Team Management, outlines the responsibilities, mission, and process management of a 
CST. It outlines the response management plan and how a CST is able to maintain 24-
hour nationwide coverage through the use of response sectors and availability cycles.23 
This information is useful when analyzing whether a CST is the appropriate agency to 
manage sUAS.  
Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 3-11.46, Weapons of Mass Destruction-Civil 
Support Team Operations, provides the “foundation of civil support team doctrine and 
focuses on the organization, mission, command and control, and operations of the WMD-
                                                 
20 Ibid., 2.  
21 Ibid., 7.  
22 National Guard Bureau, Chief of the National Guard Manual, CNGBM 2000.01 (Washington, DC: 
National Guard Bureau, 2012), www.ngbpdc.ngb.army.mil/pubs/CNGBI/CNGBM2000_ 
01_20121126.pdf.  
23 National Guard Bureau, Weapons of Mass Destruction.  
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CST.”24 It also provides a historical review of the CSTs, including the various 
presidential policy directives (PPD) and congressional authorizations that eventually 
created the team. It also provides a list of significant disasters that CSTs have been 
involved in and to what types of events the CSTs generally provide support.25 This 
information is useful when discussing the context of the CST in relation to homeland 
security. 
3. Federal Government Policy 
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) published comprehensive sUAS 
policy in 2016.26 14 CFR Part 107 stipulates the requirements for private and commercial 
use of sUAS.27 Part of this framework includes the operational limitations that private 
and commercial operators must meet to maintain their license.28 Part 107 outlines the 
“operating and certification requirements” for allowing small unmanned aircraft to 
operate within the national airspace system.29 This policy does not apply to DOD 
aircraft; however, it provides a useful framework that could be adopted by the DOD to 
streamline sUAS operations.  
The FAA and the DOD currently operate under a memorandum of agreement 
(MOA) signed in 2013. This document outlines the policies and procedures the DOD and 
the FAA agreed upon to integrate UAS into the NAS. The intent of the agreement is to 
streamline the process for requesting a certificate of authorization or waiver (COA) from 
the FAA and is a helpful source document for previous DOD-FAA agreements regarding 
                                                 
24 Department of the Army, Weapons of Mass Destruction-Civil Support Team Operations (ATP 3-
11.46) (Washington DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2007), iv.  
25 Ibid., 1-1.  
26 Operation and Certification of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 14 CFR Part 107 (2016), 
https://www.faa.gov/uas/media/RIN_2120-AJ60_Clean_Signed.pdf.  
27 Ibid.  
28 Ibid., 10–11.  
29 Ibid. 8. 
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UAS.30 Admittedly, it is limited in scope as it does not address VTOL capability used in 
immediate response missions. Finally, Presidential Decision Directive 62, Protection 
Against Unconventional Threats to the Homeland and Americans Overseas, signed in 
1998, provides the impetus for the development of DOD WMD units by tasking the DOD 
to develop consequence management units designed to respond to WMD as well as train 
first responders.31  
4. Private Sector Research  
This research used white papers and other documents written by private industry 
conducting research and development on remote ground-based CBRN air monitoring 
sensors as well as remote sensors mounted to sUAS. These sources provide excellent data 
regarding the progress of this capability. Although this research did not focus on the 
technological aspect of these sensor capabilities, there is information within the private 
industry research that is used to validate the feasibility of the concept. According to the 
International Society for Optics and Photonics (SPIE), this technology is not only feasible 
but also field tested for use by the DOD.32 SPIE’s research was conducted in cooperation 
with Physical Sciences Inc. as well as with Intelligent Optical Systems. This research 
provides insight into the research and development of this capability into the DOD. In 
addition, other commercial companies are conducting research and development in the 
hopes of selling their products to the DOD. Finally, an advertisement brochure from 
FLIR Systems offers a sensor that has already been tested on programs such as the 
DOD’s WMD Aerial Collection System (WACS) and Military Applications and 
                                                 
30 Department of Defense and Federal Aviation Administration, Memorandum of Agreement 
Concerning the Operation of Department of Defense Unmanned Aircraft Systems in the National Airspace 
System (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2013), http://www.usaasa.tradoc.army.mil/ 
docs/br_Airspace/DoDFAA_MOA_OpsinNAS_16Sep2013.pdf, 1–8.  
31 White House, Protection Against Unconventional Threats to the Homeland and Americans 
Overseas (Presidential Decision Directive 62) (Washington, DC: White House, 1998), https://fas.org/irp/
offdocs/pdd/pdd-62.pdf.  
32 William J. Marinelli et al., “Cooperative Use of Standoff and UAV Sensors for CBRNE Detection” 
in Proceedings SPIE 9455, Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and Explosives (CBRNE) Sensing, 
XVI (May 2015): 94550U–94550U, doi: 10.1117/12.2177023.  
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Reconnaissance and Surveillance (MARS).33 MARS was a program sponsored by the 
U.S. Army Research Development and Engineering Command and was intended to 
“enhance early warning for chemical/biological threats, improve hazard awareness, and 
ultimately improve the decision support confidence.”34 The test proved that aerial sensors 
could work on sUAS platforms, even when subjected to adverse environmental 
conditions and the vibration associated with the sUAS. Unfortunately, the MARS 
program was terminated in 2011 due to fiscal constraints.35   
 
 
                                                 
33 FLIR Systems, UAV Integrated Sensors for CBR Threat Monitoring [brochure] (Wilsonville, OR: 
FLIR Systems), http://www.psicorp.com/products/isr-systems/instanteye%C2%AE.  
34 U.S. Army Research Development and Engineering Command, “Military Applications in 
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II. THE CIVIL SUPPORT TEAM 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The civil support teams are instrumental resources in the nation’s response to 
weapons of mass destruction involving CBRN materials as well as other natural or 
manmade disasters that threaten life or property. They serve as the National Guard’s first 
response capability in support of civil authorities. Additionally, the role of CSTs in 
homeland security is to act as subject matter experts for CBRN and hazardous material 
(HAZMAT) response as well as to assist and to advise incident commanders during all 
hazards response. A CST is strategically located in all states and territories and can to 
respond to any incident 24 hours a day, 365 days a year, anywhere in the United States 
and its territories.  CSTs are also air, rail, and water mobile, enabling each team to 
reinforce other CSTs throughout the country and U.S. territories in the event of a large-
scale disaster. The primary goal of CSTs is to support state governors by providing 
specialized CBRN/HAZMAT detection and identification capabilities as well as 
consequence management and liaison services for follow on forces.36  
The CSTs utilize highly technical equipment, which should undergo continual 
assessment to ensure it is fielded with the most effective resources available. In addition, 
as new technologies emerge, they should be explored and harnessed to ensure the DOD’s 
domestic response effort maximizes life safety and provides critical support to 
communities during disaster response. One such emerging technology is the small 
unmanned aircraft system. The sUAS can change the way civil authorities respond to 
disasters by providing situational awareness as well as CBRN detection and 
identification. Various national and DOD strategic-level guidance documents outline the 
importance of maintaining a highly deployable and proficient CBRN response force.37 
The CSTs are optimal organizations to utilize sUAS. Their strategic locations throughout 
the country can ensure the technology is rapidly deployable to all communities, and the 
                                                 
36 National Guard Bureau, Weapons of Mass Destruction, 2.  
37 Department of Defense, Strategy for Homeland Defense.  
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DOD’s standardized training program can ensure all operators are highly skilled and 
proficient.  
B. BACKGROUND 
On May 22, 1998, President Clinton signed Presidential Decision Directive 62 
(PDD 62), which tasked the DOD with “providing training to metropolitan emergency 
responders and maintaining military units (active and reserve components) to serve as 
augmentation forces for weapons of mass destruction consequence management.” 38 In 
1998, the United States Congress, under the authority of 10 U.S. Code § 12310 
(Reserves: for Organizing, Administering, etc., Reserve Components), recognized the 
need for specially trained and equipped National Guard units capable of responding to 
CBRN events.39 The first WMD-CSTs were fielded to the National Guard in 1999. The 
intent of the WMD-CSTs was to provide each of the 50 states and four territories with a 
Title 32 active duty team capable of providing 24-hour CBRN incident response 
(intentional or unintentional) in support of civil authorities anywhere in the United States. 
In 2007, Congress expanded the mission of the WMD-CST to include all hazards 
response meaning they not only respond to CBRN incidents but also “natural or 
manmade disasters in the United States that result, or could result, in the catastrophic loss 
of life or property.”40 Today, there are 57 CSTs; one for each state and territory plus two 
teams each for California, Florida, and New York.41 Each team consists of 22 Army and 
Air National Guard personnel serving on USC Title 32 status in Active Guard Reserve 
(AGR) status.42  
CSTs have deployed to thousands of response missions as well as standby 
missions since their inception. Major operational missions for the CSTs include support 
to 9/11 and “subsequent anthrax attacks, support for Hurricanes Katrina, Wilma, and Rita 
                                                 
38 Clinton Digital Library, “Declassified Documents Concerning Presidential Decision Directive 62 
(PDD-62),” accessed July 8, 2016, http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/16200.  
39 Department of the Army, Weapons of Mass Destruction, 1-1.  
40 National Guard Bureau, Weapons of Mass Destruction, 2.  
41 Ibid., 40.  
42 Ibid., 2.  
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in 2005, assessments of the debris field resulting from the crash of the space shuttle 
Columbia,” Super Bowls, Democratic and Republican National Conventions as well as 
presidential inaugurations, and many other national special security events (NSSE).43 
C. MISSION 
According to Department of the Army, Weapons of Mass Destruction-Civil 
Support Team Operations (FM 3-11.46),  
The mission of the WMD-CST is to support civil authorities at domestic 
chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear incident sites by identifying 
CBRNE agents and substances, assessing current and projected 
consequences, advising on response measures, and assisting with 
appropriate requests for additional support.44  
The acronym “CBRNE” is referenced multiple times throughout this thesis. The “E” 
stands for high-yield explosives. Some supporting quotes reference CBRNE and others 
reference CBRN, depending on the source. For the purpose of this thesis, the terms are 
used synonymously.  
A WMD-CST is a “governor’s 911 for all hazards” response in support of civil 
authorities.45 Each CST is divided into six sections: command, operations, administrative 
and logistics, communications, medical and analytical, and survey. In addition to 
technical CBRN response, the communications section can provide robust command and 
control (C2) capabilities to civil authorities. These capabilities are designed to provide 
the supported agency with access to information and resources that it might not otherwise 
have, such as satellite communication, radio frequency cross-banding, secure and non-
secure mobile internet, and fax capability. One of the benefits of these capabilities is to 
provide civil authorities with an increased situational awareness.  
The Coast Guard defines situational awareness as “the ability to identify, process, 
and comprehend the critical elements of information about what is happening to the team 
                                                 
43 Department of the Army, Weapons of Mass Destruction.  
44 Ibid., vi. 
45 Ibid., vi. 
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with regards to the mission.”46 An incident commander’s ability to interpret data 
collected from an incident is instrumental to maintaining a safe and effective response. 
When incident commanders lack situational awareness, the result is increased risk. A 
CST is equipped with various resources designed to provide additional situational 
awareness to the incident commander so he/she can make educated decisions, thus 
reducing risk. These resources include hand-held, remote video cameras and unmanned 
ground vehicles (UGV), otherwise known as robots. These resources and their limitations 
are discussed in detail in Chapter III.  
D. WHY THE CST? 
A CST is in a unique position to provide support to every community in the 
United States and its territories, 24 hours a day, 365 days a year. Civil support teams are 
strategically located to provide timely response to all major metropolitan areas within the 
continental United States using organic transportation assets.47 Additionally, all CSTs are 
divided into six “response sectors” (see Figure 1).48 Each response sector contains 
between nine and 10 CSTs. Teams in each response sector rotate response status each 
month so that one team is always in “immediate response,” or “gold” status.49 Teams in 
immediate response status must be prepared to deploy from home station within three 
hours of notification.50 This ensures there are always six deployable teams at all times 
and allows team members not in a response status to manage leave, schools, and other 
training that would otherwise preclude them from deploying their entire team. When not 
in an official response cycle, all teams remain responsible for being prepared to respond 
within their respective state 24/7. If a team cannot support a mission, they are considered 
                                                 
46 U.S. Coast Guard, Team Coordination Training Student Guide (8/98) (Washington, DC: U.S. Coast 
Guard, 1998), https://www.uscg.mil/auxiliary/training/tct/.  
47 Consequence Management Program and Integration Office, Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil 
Support Teams WMD CST Doctrine Handbook (No. 1-2000) (Washington DC: Consequence Management 
Program and Integration Office, 2000), https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=450810, 5.  
48 National Guard Bureau, Weapons of Mass Destruction, 4.  
49 Ibid.  
50 Ibid. 
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“black” and must report that to the National Guard Bureau.51 Figure 1 is a map of the 57 
teams and their locations.  
 
Figure 1.  CST Locations52 
A natural or manmade CBRN or HAZMAT threat is always present in any region 
or city. Not all communities are equally prepared to respond to these threats, and 
numerous factors can affect a community’s ability to respond to incidents. For instance, 
some communities have multiple resources at their disposal while others have limited 
resources due to lack of personnel, budget, equipment, or legal constraints. Additionally, 
many communities rely on mutual aid agreements with other agencies for assistance in 
                                                 
51 Ibid.  
52 Source: Washington National Guard, “Homeland Response Force,” last modified November 21, 
2016, http://mil.wa.gov/homeland-response-force.  
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specialized support. When this support is insufficient or otherwise unavailable, the local 
incident commander can request CST support through the governor. If each CST had 
sUAS, it would be able to provide better support to the entire country within a short 
amount of time. Additionally, the equipment and training can be standardized, provided 
at no cost to the requestor, and increase the potential to save lives.  
E. THE CIVIL SUPPORT TEAM OF THE FUTURE 
One of the deciding factors to the success of any organization is its ability to 
adapt to new opportunities and harness emerging technologies. The rapid advancement of 
sUAS technology provides a unique opportunity to explore ways to improve existing 
capabilities. Each new capability afforded to the CST instantly changes the disaster 
response nationwide and serves to enhance support to civil authorities. Ample federal 
guidance exists to justify the development of improved CBRN response capabilities. The 
2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) conducted an assessment of key CBRN 
capabilities and determined the need for the following in the future:53 
• “Field faster, more flexible consequence management response forces.” 
The success of these CBRN response forces demonstrates the need to 
maintain the capability; however, reorganization is necessary to “improve 
lifesaving capabilities, maximize their flexibility, and reduce response 
times.”54  
• “Enhance capabilities for domain awareness.” This initiative is aimed at 
partnering with our neighboring countries to improve domain awareness 
capabilities. This initiative is written in a global context but is also 
pertinent to domestic operations. The use of military resources to improve 
awareness is already commonplace in the United States and can be 
improved. Current domestic doctrine utilizes incident awareness and 
assessment (IAA), which is an information collection process used to 
“analyze the impact of events and conditions involved with defense 
support to civil authorities (DSCA) operations.”55 IAA is a mission 
generally conducted with manned aircraft equipped with cameras and 
video downlink systems. This information enables decision makers to 
                                                 
53 Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review, 19–20. These three initiatives are discussed 
throughout the thesis.  
54 Ibid.  
55 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Defense Support of Civil Authorities (JP3-28) (Washington DC: Joint Chiefs 
of Staff, 2013), IV-2.  
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“see” the incident without having to be inside the aircraft, thus increasing 
situational awareness. These systems can be expensive and are often 
unavailable due to maintenance or weather. A sUAS with a video feed 
could provide similar capabilities at a fraction of the cost. 
• “Accelerate the development of standoff radiological/nuclear detection 
capabilities.” This initiative provides the guidance to continue to develop 
improved, remote sensors. Developing and fielding remote sensors 
capable of increased standoff distance will greatly enhance the ability of 
response forces to detect and identify radiological or nuclear threats 
without endangering response personnel.56  
The 2014 QDR acknowledges the improvements made as a result of the 2010 
QDR and stresses the need to continue improvements in response to threats through 
better pre- and post-incident coordination with civil authorities.57 These initiatives 
outline the DOD’s expectations for the future of CBRN response. Additionally, they 
reflect goals of the entirety of the DOD CBRN response enterprise (CRE); however, they 
also identify the need to continually improve current capabilities. Moreover, this 
guidance can be adapted to meet the needs of the homeland. In fact, there is similar 
guidance from departments within the federal government. For example, the Department 
of Homeland Security’s National Preparedness Guidelines states, “Strengthening 
CBRNE detection, response, and decontamination capabilities” as one of their top eight 
priorities.58  
F. CONCLUSION 
The civil support teams have supported civil authorities during intentional and 
unintentional disaster response incidents since 1999. These teams are comprised of highly 
skilled technicians capable of providing a multitude of capabilities to civil authorities, 
including CBRN detection and identification, communications support, and command 
and control resources intended to increase situational awareness. Emerging technologies 
highlight the importance of continuously assessing and improving current capabilities. 
                                                 
56 Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review, 19–20.  
57 Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 
2014), 33. 
58 Department of Homeland Security, National Preparedness Guidelines, 18. 
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The rapid advancement of sUAS technology creates an opportunity to enhance CBRN 
detection through the integration of CBRN response, aerial remote sensing, increased 
situational awareness, and life safety. The CSTs’ strategic locations throughout the 
country make them accessible to any community within the United States and its 
territories within a short time. This nationwide accessibility makes CSTs ideal candidates 
for a specialized technology that might otherwise be difficult for resource-constrained 
communities to acquire.  
The role of CSTs in CBRN response is clear; they are to assist in the detection 
and identification of the CBRN threat as well as provide situational awareness to civil 
authorities. The current threat dictates established tactics, techniques, and procedures 
(TTPs). These TTPs are sufficient given the current resources; however, the emergence 
of sUAS technology could dramatically improve responder safety and operational 
capabilities. An understanding of the current and historical threat will further build the 
foundation for the CSTs’ role in homeland security as well as how sUAS capability could 




III. THE THREAT AND HOW SUAS TECHNOLOGY CAN 
MITIGATE IT 
A. INTRODUCTION 
No threat poses as grave a danger to our security and well-being as the 
potential use of nuclear weapons and materials by irresponsible states or 
terrorists.   
2015 National Security Strategy59 
 
The use of weapons of mass destruction continues to be a serious threat to the 
United States. This threat includes chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear 
materials.60 The United States has been relatively successful at preventing WMD attacks; 
to date, only two successful attacks have occurred on U.S. soil. These attacks resulted in 
five deaths and injured over 750 people, and they demonstrate the need for continued 
diligence regarding the prevention of the use of WMD.  
The release of CBRN material, whether intentional or unintentional, is a 
dangerous threat, and it requires quick and accurate detection and identification. For the 
purpose of this thesis, it does not matter whether the threat of release is intentional or 
unintentional as the resulting response is often similar in nature. The threat of an 
unintentional release of CBRN material via natural disaster or HAZMAT accident has a 
higher likelihood of occurrence and requires equal attention as an intentional attack. A 
brief review of previous U.S. and international CBRN events demonstrates the 
devastation such an event can cause.  
Federal guidance dictates that continuous efforts must be made to improve the 
nation’s response to CBRN events.61 These improvements include better TTPs, training, 
equipment, and detection and identification capabilities. Current detection and 
                                                 
59 White House, National Security Strategy.  
60 Ibid., 11.  
61 Department of Homeland Security, National Preparedness Guidelines, 18.  
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identification capabilities are robust; however, emerging technology in unmanned aircraft 
systems has the potential to revolutionize the homeland CBRN response.  
B. BACKGROUND 
To understand the CBRN threat, several major historical CBRN events are 
reviewed below. These events demonstrate the need for robust CBRN response 
capabilities in the United States.  
1. Intentional attacks  
There have been only two successful WMD attacks in the United States (1984 
salmonella poisoning and post-9/11 anthrax attacks). It is noteworthy that U.S. citizens, 
not international terrorists, committed these attacks. 
a. United States  
• Oregon salmonella poisoning. This attack occurred in the Dalles, Oregon 
in 1984 when a Buddhist cult attempted to infect locals with salmonella by 
sprinkling it on various food items at local restaurants and a supermarket. 
Their intent was to influence a vote by sickening likely voters and 
flooding the voting booths with homeless people. There were no deaths, 
but over 750 people became ill.62 
• U.S. anthrax attack. Shortly after 9/11, several mailings containing 
anthrax arrived at media outlets and two Democrat senators’ offices. Five 
Americans were killed, and 17 injured in what was the worst biological 
attack in U.S. history.63 The investigation finally closed in 2010 when the 
only suspect in the case committed suicide after learning he was going to 
be arrested. 
b. International  
This thesis considers two international WMD attacks, the Tokyo sarin gas attack 
and the water poisoning in the Philippines.  
                                                 
62 Philip Elmer-DeWitt, “America’s First Bioterrorism Attack,” Time, September 30, 2001, 
http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,176937,00.html.  




• Tokyo sarin gas attack. The doomsday cult known as Aum Shinrikyo 
released sarin gas in the Tokyo subway station during rush hour in 1995 
killing 13 people and leaving over 6,000 sick or injured. The attack 
involved five people located through several lines of the Tokyo subway 
system. The sarin gas was inside plastic bags and then wrapped in 
newspaper. Each individual used the end of a sharpened umbrella to 
puncture the bag exposing the other passengers to the sarin.64  
• Manila, Philippines water poisoning. Residents of a village in the 
Philippines gave water poisoned with pesticide to members of the 
Philippine Constabulary while on a run in Manila in 1987. The poison 
killed 19 members of the constabulary.65  
2. Accidents  
WMD incidents are not just intentional. There is also the potential for accidents 
involving CBRN, such as the case of the train derailment in Weyauwega and that of the 
the Fukushima power plant.  
• Weyauwega, WI train derailment. In 1996, there was a train derailment 
involving 37 cars, including 16 tankers (14 hauling liquid petroleum gas 
and two hauling sodium hydroxide) in the rural town of Weyauwega, WI. 
The local fire department was unaware of the contents of the tankers for 
several hours until the train company arrived with the manifest. The 
assistant fire chief noted that the tankers were a “ticking time bomb” and 
the entire community would have been devastated if the tankers had 
exploded.66 The incident resulted in the evacuation of 2200 residents for 
three weeks as responders worked to eliminate the danger.67 This incident 
and its relationship with sUAS is discussed later in this chapter. 
• Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant. The fifteenth largest nuclear 
power plant in the world. Damage from a 9.0 earthquake and subsequent 
major tsunami in 2011 caused the nuclear reactors to lose their cooling 
ability resulting in melted cores. The resulting meltdown caused 
                                                 
64 Tomohiro Osaki, “Deadly Sarin Attack on Tokyo Subway System Recalled 20 Years On,” The 
Japan Times Online, March 20, 2015, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/03/20/national/
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65 Mark Fineman, “Filipino Troops Given Poisoned Water; 19 Die,” Los Angeles Times, September 7, 
1987, http://articles.latimes.com/1987-09-07/news/mn-4192_1_poisoned-water.  
66 Duke Behnke, “Weyauwega 1996: ‘I Will Never Forget It,’” Post-Crescent Media, March 4, 2016, 
http://www.postcrescent.com/story/news/local/2016/03/04/weyauwega-1996-never-
forget/80750018/.  
67 Ibid.  
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explosions releasing radioactive material into the surrounding air.68 Of 
note and since the incident in 2011, sUAS have been used to conduct wide 
area radiation monitoring of the power plant. In 2015, Japanese scientists 
developed a sUAS capable of flying inside the reactors using laser 
technology for guidance. The sUAS was able to guide itself throughout the 
power plant without using GPS data as well as replace its own batteries.69 
The WMD threat from hostile state and non-state actors continues to be a 
significant concern.70 Experts note there is a 100 percent probability that the United 
States will encounter a WMD at some point.71 This level of certainty insinuates there is 
nothing the United States can do to prevent all attacks; therefore, it is imperative to 
continually improve response capabilities to minimize the damage when an attack occurs. 
The Weyauwega train accident demonstrates that some threats may go unnoticed by 
responders upon arrival at the incident. The ability to detect and identify these threats 
could save the lives of both responders and members of the local community. 
Additionally, early identification of these threats is a function of situational awareness.   
C. SITUATIONAL AWARENESS AS A THREAT 
The lack of situational awareness during a CBRN incident is itself a threat. The 
first priority of every incident commander is life safety,72 and every other objective is 
subordinate to safety. An inaccurate or incomplete understanding of the environment 
limits the incident commander’s ability to manage resources and can compromise safety. 
The second priority is the stabilization and safety of the incident.73 The incident 
                                                 
68 World Nuclear Association, “Fukushima Accident,” last modified November 2016, 
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71 Ronald Kessler, “FBI: 100 Percent Chance of WMD Attack,” Newsmax, February 14, 2011, 
http://www.newsmax.com/RonaldKessler/zawahiri-weapons-mass-destruction/2011/02/
14/id/386055/.  
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commander cannot stabilize the incident without proper situational awareness. The 
ensuing confusion following a disaster can complicate response efforts and lead to hasty 
decisions by the command, which can result in increased risk to rescuers and those 
needing to be rescued. Every resource should be utilized to maximize the understanding 
of the operational environment as soon as possible. Incident commanders have limited 
resources available to assist them during a CBRN response. Hand-held Video Cameras 
CSTs are equipped with hand-held video cameras carried by personnel entering 
the potentially contaminated area. The intent is to use the camera to conduct a site 
characterization and provide the incident commander with an actual picture of the 
environment rather than rely only on radio communication. This resource can be valuable 
because it provides the decision makers with a clear understanding of a situation; 
however, it does not increase standoff distance or provide situational awareness to the IC 
prior to sending responders into a potentially contaminated area.  
1. Unmanned Ground Vehicles  
Some agencies utilize remote ground vehicles with CBRN sensors and video 
cameras that are deployable into a suspected contamination zone; however, those assets 
are uncommon. Currently, unmanned ground vehicles equipped with remote detection 
equipment provide standoff distance for responders but also have limitations. First, they 
are expensive; UGVs cost between $20,000 and $195,000, depending on the equipment 
ordered.74 UGVs equipped with CBRN sensors and video capabilities tend to be on the 
higher end of the cost spectrum. Second, they are slow. The maximum speed for many of 
these vehicles is less than six miles per hour.75 Third, they are unable to assess a large-
scale incident from all angles or to include aerial imagery and air monitoring. Aerial 
imagery and air monitoring could provide useful data for plume modeling as well as 
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75 Army Technology, “iRobot 510 PackBot Multi-Mission Robot, United States of America,” accessed 
October 2, 2016, http://www.army-technology.com/projects/irobot-510-packbot-multi-
mission-robot/.  
 28 
provide damage assessments for inaccessible areas of an incident. Finally, UGVs are 
limited to ground operations and susceptible to barriers or obstacles encountered on the 
ground.  
D. CURRENT CBRN CHALLENGES TO RESPONDERS 
A CBRN incident complicates many facets of a response. As discussed in the 
Weyauwega train derailment incident, there are times when an incident does not 
demonstrate the immediate characteristics of a CBRN event, and responders must adapt 
quickly. In addition, incident commanders can be faced with multiple challenges as they 
develop a situation. Response tactics, techniques, and procedures are limited to the 
resources available at the time, which means incident commanders must often send 
responders into a potentially dangerous environment without fully understanding the 
complexity of the situation. This presents several significant and potentially unnecessary 
safety and operational challenges including challenges to safety, operational 
considerations, and situational awareness.  
1. Safety 
The incident commander is responsible for all aspects of a response including the 
lives of the responders as well as the victims.76 The safety and operational challenges 
posed by disasters can be mitigated to a manageable level by proper training and 
equipment, but risks can remain high. First, the detection and identification of any CBRN 
material requires personnel to enter a contamination zone with detection equipment. This 
action places the entry personnel at risk of exposure. To mitigate the risk of exposure, 
responders must wear appropriate personal protective equipment (PPE). In the case of a 
CBRN event, responders are required to wear a certain level of HAZMAT PPE 
commensurate to the type of threat. The most protective ensemble is called level A. This 
suit is selected when the responder requires the highest level of respiratory, eye, and skin 
                                                 
76 U.S. Department of Labor, “Incident Command System (ICS) eTool—Incident Commander,” 
accessed July 12, 2016, https://www.osha.gov/SLTC/etools/ics/inci.html.  
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protection.77 The suit is totally encapsulating and provides oxygen via a self-contained 
breathing apparatus (SCBA).  
The level A suit is very effective at personnel protection but creates significant 
concerns for incident commanders. First, the sheer weight of this ensemble causes slower 
movement. The weight of the SCBA is 40 pounds and that does not include the weight of 
the garment.78 Second, the restricted breathing causes the onset of exhaustion more 
rapidly as well as limiting time on station to the duration of the oxygen tank. Third, there 
is always a risk of a level A suit tearing while in a contaminated area resulting in 
contamination of a responder. This situation can be potentially fatal depending on the 
substance exposed to the skin. Fourth, the wearer has limited vision, which can be 
dangerous if entering an area with multiple obstacles, such as a residence or building.79 
Tripping hazards increase the risk of injury or suit tear resulting in a potential 
contamination situation. Firefighting suits are designed for durability; however, level A 
HAZMAT suits are made of Tyvek and are more easily torn. Finally, and possibly most 
important, are the multiple psychological and physiological stressors that accompany 
CBRN entry.  
The complete encapsulation of a person causes considerable physiological stress. 
The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) studied the effects of 
workers wearing chemical protective suits and found that worker tolerance time was 
reduced by 56 percent while wearing level A suits compared to working in light 
clothing.80 Additionally, heat stress and exhaustion occur more quickly when operating 
in a level A suit due to the lack of air circulation. The NIOSH recommends wearing suits 
                                                 
77 U.S. Department of Labor, “Occupational Safety and Health Standards: Hazardous Materials,” 
August 1994, https://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document? 
p_table=standards&p_id=9767, 1910.120 App B.  
78 Chemical Stockpile Preparedness Section, Nuclear and Chemical Hazards Branch, Preparedness 
Division, DHS/FEMA, Fact Sheet: Personal Protective Equipment Levels and Risks (Washington, DC: 
Chemical Stockpile Preparedness Section, Nuclear and Chemical Hazards Branch, Preparedness Division, 
DHS/FEMA, 2004), https://www.cseppportal.net/csepp_portal_resources/ppe_factsheet.pdf, 
3.  
79 CHEMM, “Personal Protective Equipment (PPE),” accessed July 12, 2016, 
https://chemm.nlm.nih.gov/ppe.htm.  
80 Nancy J. Bollinger and Robert H Schutz, NIOSH Guide to Industrial Respiratory Protection 
(Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 1987), 122. 
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in the morning or evening when possible.81 However, this is unrealistic given the 
unpredictable nature of the incident.  
2. Operational Considerations  
Time is essential for the quick detection, identification, and decontamination of 
CBRN materials. Responders must work quickly to assess the immediate environment as 
well as conduct a plume analysis to prepare for potential follow-on effects on the 
population. Current resources are effective but not conducive to a quick response. 
Preparing for entry into a CBRN environment is methodical and tedious. Donning a 
Level A suit equipped with a SCBA takes valuable time. Although there is no industry 
standard for a minimum time in which one must be able to don a Level A suit, Figure 2 is 
a sample checklist published by OSHA of the steps that should be accomplished when 
donning a suit.82 This 16-step checklist is extensive in nature and indicates the donning 
process can take considerable time. 
                                                 
81 Ibid., 123. 
82 Occupational Safety and Health Administration, “VI. Clothing Donning, Duffing, and Use,” in 
OSHA Training Manual (Washington, DC: Occupational Safety and Health Administration, 1999), last 
modified April 14, 2016, https://www.osha.gov/dts/osta/otm/otm_viii/otm_viii_1.html#6, 
Table VIII:1-5.  
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Figure 2.  Sample Checklist for Level A Donning83 
Considerable care must be given to the proper fitting of the suit as well as 
ensuring all equipment is in working order. Once inside the contamination zone, the 
assessment process is equally methodical and tedious. Slow-moving entry teams must 
navigate through a potentially unknown and dangerous environment while conducting 
site characterization. The contaminated environment may be the scene of a recent 
explosion or a house with unknown hazards inside, and the entry team may have limited 
situational awareness about the environment they are entering. Once the site 
characterization is complete, the members of the entry team must proceed to the 
decontamination area where they will be decontaminated by a separate team of personnel 
before reporting to the incident commander for debrief. This process is well established 
and practiced, but new technology can offer significant process improvement. 
Communication between the entry personnel and the command post is difficult. 
The gas mask with associated oxygen tank makes talking difficult from inside the suit. 
Words are often muffled or distorted, leading to a breakdown in communication. 
Communication can be further degraded by factors such as the physical fitness of the 
                                                 
83 Source: Occupational Safety and Health Administration, “VI. Clothing Donning, Duffing, and Use.”  
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entry team members, quality of the radios, and the amount of equipment team members 
carry. One team member must have a free hand to push the transmit button on the radio, 
so that member can only carry a limited amount of equipment or must place it on the 
ground to transmit.  
3. Situational Awareness 
Situational awareness is the key to a safe and successful response effort. Incident 
commanders can better manage scenes, make better decisions, and allocate resources 
more effectively if they have a clear understanding of the situation. CBRN incidents are 
unique in that they prevent most people from entering the area, thus degrading the IC’s 
ability to assess the situation. The IC is totally dependent on the capabilities of the entry 
team members and their ability to assess the environment and communicate that 
assessment to the IC. This method works but fails to capitalize on emerging technologies 
that could provide faster, more effective assessments of the environment.  
E. SUAS BENEFITS, EMERGING CAPABILITIES, AND JUSTIFICATION 
FOR CST  
sUAS could be valuable tools for emergency responders for rapid response 
and gaining invaluable situational awareness before responding to and 
engaging in potentially dangerous operations.  
Representative for the Department of Homeland Security Robotic Aircraft for 
Safety (RAPS) Project84 
 
Emergency responders respond to hundreds of HAZMAT/CBRN incidents every 
year. An analysis of the North American HAZMAT Situations and Deployment Map 
shows 550 responses resulting from biological, chemical, explosions/explosives/fires, 
odors/fumes/suspicious fumes, radiation/radiological, and suspicious or threatening 
powder between June 1, 2015, and May 31, 2016.85 Many of these calls resulted in 
evacuations, injuries, and hospitalizations. These are the incidents that can benefit the 
                                                 
84 Department of Homeland Security, Privacy Impact Assessment for the Robotic Aircraft for Safety 
(RAPS) Project (Washington DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2012), 2. 
85 Global Incident Map, “North American HAZMAT Situations and Deployment Map,” accessed on 
July 12, 2016, from http://hazmat.globalincidentmap.com/home.php.  
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most from emerging sUAS technology. The concept of equipping CSTs with small, 
unmanned aircraft systems has the potential to transform CBRN response in the 
homeland by creating a nationwide capability that could be invaluable to all 
communities.  
The sUAS concept is not new; in fact, government agencies are already 
conducting testing on sUAS equipped with CBRN sensors and video cameras with the 
intent of providing them to emergency responders to improve disaster response. For 
example, DHS conducted testing on fixed wing and VTOL sUAS to improve response to 
multiple disasters, including “natural and hazardous materials disaster evaluation and 
response.”86 In another example, the Department of Defense is currently conducting 
testing on fixed wing and VTOL sUAS with the intent of detecting and identifying 
chemical and biological agents.87 However, analysis of current DOD testing programs 
indicates that these capabilities are being tested for use overseas and not for use within 
the United States.  
Much of the work conducted by the CST is done inside buildings or structures 
where personnel conduct site characterization to identify potential WMD materials. In 
these cases, the operator may be unable to maintain line of sight with an aircraft. This 
creates a challenge since the benefit of this system relies on increasing standoff distance 
for responders. Most sUAS today use GPS for navigation. While GPS navigation is very 
accurate, it is not conducive for flight indoors where satellite signal may not be present or 
for the more precise navigation required for maneuvering through the inside of a 
building.88 Emerging technology uses alternate navigation capabilities that do not rely on 
GPS and will enable a sUAS to navigate inside a building without human interaction. For 
example, one technology involves the use of lasers for navigation. The VTOL sUAS 
interacts with a tripod ground station located in the vicinity of the sUAS.89 Although this 
                                                 
86 Department of Homeland Security, Privacy Impact Assessment, 2.  
87 Global Defense, “Thunderstorm: Drones in CBRN Detection and Terrorism,” November 3, 2014, 
http://globalbiodefense.com/2014/11/03/thunderstorm-drones-cbrn-detection-terrorism/. 
88 Mike Senese, “PreNav Reveals Centimeter-Accurate Drone System,” Make, August 27, 2016, 
http://makezine.com/2015/08/26/prenav-reveals-centimeter-accurate-drone-system/.  
89 Ibid.  
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technology is not yet applicable to this proposal due to the necessity of manually placing 
a ground station inside the building, it is an indication of how this technology is evolving. 
Another technology involves the use of algorithms, gyroscopes, accelerometers, and 
camcorders to create autonomous navigation.90 These technologies are only the first step 
to creating the capability to use sUAS to conduct site characterization inside structures 
without endangering personnel.  
The potential benefits of sUAS are numerous, and five major ones are outlined in 
the following section. First, sUAS can reduce human exposure to unsafe environments by 
increasing the standoff distance between the responders and the contaminated area. This 
will enable the incident commander to reduce the risk of exposures to responders. The 
use of sUAS will not likely eliminate the need for entry personnel; however, they can 
greatly reduce the risk if able to detect and identify CBRN matter prior to entry. Once 
personnel enter an area, they will likely have much better situational awareness based on 
the information gained from the sUAS.  
Second, sUAS can improve the life safety of victims affected by the disaster by 
remotely transmitting video of the condition of any injured personnel. This will enable 
the incident commander to develop an effective medical evacuation plan prior to 
deploying responders into the contamination zone.  
Third, sUAS can establish the parameters of the incident. They can isolate the 
source, determine the size of the incident, detect plume movement, and send valuable 
video to the IC.91 They can also provide valuable data regarding any spillage or runoff of 
chemicals into neighboring areas.92 Potential video information might include sensory 
information such as the placard information on an overturned rail or truck tanker or other 
                                                 
90 Press Trust of India, “New Autonomous Flying Drones Don’t Require GPS to Navigate,” Gadgets 
360, May 27, 2015, http://gadgets.ndtv.com/others/news/new-autonomous-flying-drones-
dont-require-gps-to-navigate-696750.  
91 Robin R. Murphy et al., “Projected Needs for Robot-Assisted Chemical, Biological, Radiological, 
or Nuclear (CBRN) Incidents,” in IEEE International Symposium on Safety, Security, and Rescue Robotics 
(Piscataway, NJ: IEEE, 2012), http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/6523881/, 3.  
92 Ibid.  
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details, such as the color of the smoke, type of liquid on the ground, as well as other 
defining characteristics that might assist in the identification of the material.93  
Fourth, sUAS will greatly reduce the time required to send assets into a 
contamination zone. The asset could deploy almost immediately after arrival on scene. 
The operator could deploy the sUAS into the incident area to collect data while the entry 
personnel are preparing themselves and their equipment. Moreover, the results of the 
sUAS flight could help determine what level of PPE the entry personnel would wear and 
what additional detection and sampling equipment they would need. Furthermore, there 
would likely be times when the sUAS determined there is no danger at all and personnel 
could enter the incident area with minimal PPE to confirm initial results.  
Fifth, additional operational benefits of sUAS are cost, size, and disposability. 
sUAS will likely be relatively inexpensive compared to UGV. Many agencies do not 
have the resources to purchase and maintain this capability, but they could request it 
through their respective state’s CST if it was so equipped. sUAS are small in size and 
weight. sUAS selection criteria should be based on size groupings established by the 
Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff minimum training standards. These details are discussed 
in detail later in this thesis. 
An example in which a combination of the above sUAS attributes might have a 
live-saving impact might be the train derailment in Weyauwega (see Figure 3), discussed 
earlier in this chapter. The train derailed resulting in a massive chemical spill and fire. 
Emergency responders lacked situational awareness due to the limited resources available 
at the time, the rural location of the community, and the lack of a manifest detailing the 
contents of the train. The local fire department spent an hour battling the blaze before the 
train operator arrived with the manifest, and it was discovered that the contents of the 
tanker were explosive and could level the community.94 The incident commander would 
likely have managed the incident much differently if he/she had the ability to identify the 
contents of the tanker quickly. In this case, a sUAS could prove instrumental by flying 
                                                 
93 Ibid.  
94 Behnke, “Weyauwega 1996.”  
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close enough to the tanker to identify the HAZMAT placard. Additionally, it could take 
an aerial view of the fire to help responders get a clearer understanding of the source of 
the fire, identify the type of tanker involved, and potentially obtain plume data to 
determine evacuation procedures.  
 
Figure 3.  The Weyauwega Area Train Crash95  
F. CONCLUSION 
The CBRN threat continues to be one of the most dangerous threats to our 
country. Whether the attack is intentional or unintentional, the response is relatively the 
same. History demonstrates the frequency of CBRN events and the need for continued 
improvements to response capabilities. Emergency responders have worked tirelessly to 
develop TTPs that maximize life safety, incident safety, and minimize property damage; 
however, there may be new resources that can improve capabilities. Emerging 
technologies in sUAS create an opportunity to harness a new capability to transform 
disaster response in the homeland.  
                                                 
95 Source: Behnke, “Weyauwega 1996.”  
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The Department of Homeland Security is currently testing this capability because 
it recognizes the value of increased situational awareness for incident commanders and 
increased safety for response personnel. Additionally, the Department of Defense is also 
already using fixed wing UAS with CBRN sensors in overseas operations. The DOD is 
also testing VTOL capabilities; however, it appears focused on overseas operations rather 
than domestic use. The private industry is also working to create autonomous navigation 
technology that may enable a sUAS to navigate inside structures and perform site 
characterization and damage assessment with minimal human interaction. The challenge 
is nesting the two organizational resources together to create a framework for homeland 
CBRN defense involving sUAS. National Guard CSTs remain poised to accept this 
technology and are well positioned to support any community in the United States with 
this capability. The following chapters discuss current sUAS policy and strategy as well 
as identify gaps within that framework and make recommendations for implementation. 
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IV. POLICY AND STRATEGY ANALYSIS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The central premise of this thesis is that current DOD policy is limited in scope 
and should be revised to authorize sUAS for use in support of civil authorities when 
responding to CBRN or HAZMAT incidents. There is no current DOD domestic sUAS 
policy; however, the existing large UAS domestic policy and sUAS fixed wing policies 
provide a useful framework for the development of small, VTOL sUAS policy. The 
intent of current policy is to provide governors the ability to include large UAS in their 
emergency planning and request federal UAS assets in support of homeland defense 
(HD), defense support to civil authorities, and military training and exercises during 
large-scale disasters.96 This policy is sufficient for current UAS operations but does not 
address the sUAS capability as discussed in this thesis.  
Current UAS guidance is restrictive in nature and requires SecDef approval for all 
missions except search and rescue, which can be approved by a four-star combatant 
commander.97 This approval process is time consuming and not conducive to providing 
immediate support to civil authorities. The CST is an immediate response organization 
and the authority to employ its resources remains with a governor or his/her designated 
representative as with all other National Guard assets. The current UAS approval process 
precludes rapid deployment. Ultimately, rapid deployment is necessary to provide 
valuable, time-sensitive situational awareness to incident commanders.  
The DOD’s current domestic UAS policy is outlined in deputy secretary of 
defense (DEPSECDEF) policy memorandum 15-002, Guidance for the Domestic Use of 
Unmanned Aircraft Systems. For the purpose of this thesis, the term “UAS” refers to 
large fixed wing aircraft, such as the Air Force RQ-1 Predator or the MQ-9 Reaper. Each 
of these aircraft have a wingspan of over 50 feet wide and are at least 27 feet long.98 The 
                                                 
96 Deputy Secretary of Defense, Guidance for the Domestic Use, 2.  
97 Ibid.  
98 Joakim Kasper Oestergaard Balle, “About the Predator and Reaper,” Aeroweb, June 27, 2016, 
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 40 
term “sUAS” refers to small, handheld UAS normally operated by the U.S. Army. The 
term “sUAS” can refer to fixed wing or vertical takeoff and landing aircraft. Any 
reference to fixed wing sUAS is termed “fixed wing sUAS.” The term “sUAS” refers to 
VTOL aircraft. This thesis is the first step towards developing the foundation for the 
proposed sUAS policy.  
Though current DOD sUAS training is focused on overseas operations, it does 
provide a useful framework for developing a domestic training program. The domestic 
training program should encompass elements from existing literature and incorporate 
domestic-specific elements that have not been addressed to date. The flight characteristics 
of most sUAS today are simplistic and semi-autonomous. Many sUAS are designed with 
features such as auto-hover, return-to-home, and auto-land features. These features 
enable flight with minimal operator input. Future DOD sUAS should have similar flight 
characteristics providing safety mechanisms, which could prevent operation outside 
established parameters, such as max altitude, airspeed, and obstruction detection.  
Ensuring the privacy of U.S. persons remains one of the most important factors 
when considering sUAS use by the DOD. This is accomplished via the DOD Intelligence 
Oversight Program. Any sUAS with a camera and sensing equipment requires strict 
control measures to ensure the Fourth Amendment rights of U.S. persons are maintained 
and that the intent of Executive Order 12333 U.S. Intelligence Activities is adhered to. 
DOD policy should be nested with state “drone” legislation to ensure all privacy concerns 
are addressed and that sUAS are utilized within legal constraints in each state. The 
existing intelligence oversight program is robust and provides a workable framework for 
establishing a successful sUAS program. 
Finally, a significant challenge of this program is the integration of DOD assets 
into the national airspace system. Recent FAA guidance authorizes very specific 
guidelines for the private and commercial use of sUAS in national airspace. Several 
aspects of this proposal may challenge the current guidelines. Close coordination between 
the DOD and the FAA will be instrumental in the successful implementation of this 
proposal.  
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B. ANALYSIS OF CURRENT DOD UAS POLICY 
Current DOD UAS policy encompasses two different operating environments: 
combat/overseas operations and domestic operations. Small UAS use is primarily 
restricted to combat operations due to the lack of a mission set within the homeland as 
well as the lack of policy addressing domestic issues, such as intelligence oversight, 
training, and comprehensive FAA integration. There is domestic sUAS fixed wing policy, 
but it is intended to authorize training within special use airspace or through the use of a 
COA. This policy is set out in training manuals and regulations governing the use of 
sUAS. However, there is policy governing the use of large UAS for domestic operations. 
This thesis and its framework can be utilized as a foundation for development of a 
domestic sUAS program. Current policy is not intended to address sUAS employed by 
the National Guard in support of disaster response; therefore, it lacks key components 
that are necessary for successful implementation. There are five pillars that establish the 
framework of current domestic UAS policy.99  
1. Approved Missions 
Current deputy SecDef policy memorandum 15-002 authorizes the use of large 
UAS for five mission sets: DOD operations, state/National Guard operations, search and 
rescue, DOD-required exercises and training, and exercises, training, and activities not 
required by DOD.  
a. DOD Operations 
UAS may be used in lieu of manned aircraft when: 
• “Sustained endurance efforts are required 
• Unmanned aircraft provide superior capabilities; or 
• Physical infrastructure limitations prohibit the use of manned rotary—or 
fixed-wing aircraft”100 
                                                 
99 Deputy Secretary of Defense, Guidance for the Domestic Use.  
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b. State/National Guard Operations  
The policy memorandum stipulates that governors may not employ DOD UAS 
assets without approval from the SecDef. Governors may incorporate the use of UAS into 
their disaster response plans and should include procedures for obtaining approval and 
coordination with the FAA. 
c. Search and Rescue  
UAS may be used for search and rescue (SAR) provided a UAS is the most useful 
platform, and it does not interfere with other military duties of the unit concerned. 
d. DOD-required Exercises and Training  
UAS are approved to conduct normal proficiency training as well as participate in 
scheduled exercises that provide essential training for the Federal mission area.  
e. Exercises, Training, and Activities Not Required By DOD  
UAS are authorized to participate in state-sponsored disaster response exercises 
with prior approval from the SecDef.  
2. Approval Authority  
The SecDef reserves the right to approve all domestic UAS operations with the 
exception of SAR. The appropriate combatant commander, either U.S. Northern 
Command or U.S. Pacific Command, may approve SAR. The strict approval process is 
likely due to public sensitivity of DOD UAS operating within the United States. 
Although sufficient for current domestic UAS doctrine, this process is time consuming 
and not conducive to rapid response.  
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C. INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT 
The purpose of the intelligence oversight program is to ensure that “intelligence 
activities are carried out in ways that do not infringe on the constitutional rights of U.S. 
persons.”101 U.S. persons are defined as  
A person who is a lawful permanent resident as defined by 8 U.S.C. 1101 
(a) (20) or who is a protected individual as defined by 8 U.S.C. 1324b (a) 
(3). It also means any corporation, business association, partnership, 
society, trust, or any other entity, organization or group that is 
incorporated to do business in the United States. It also includes any 
governmental (federal, state or local) entity. It does not include any 
foreign person as defined in § 120.16 of this part.102 
A key component of the intelligence oversight program is to ensure any 
information obtained on U.S. persons is “collected, processed, retained, and disseminated 
properly.”103 It closely mirrors the intent of the Fourth Amendment by ensuring people 
are “secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches 
and seizures.”104 The authority of the DOD to collect information on U.S. persons is 
rooted in current policy. DOD 5240.1-R authorizes the collection of information by DOD 
assets on U.S. persons, as long there is a need to protect the safety of any person or 
organization.105 The same policy authorizes the use of overhead reconnaissance as long 
as it is not directed at specific U.S. persons.106  
This thesis explores the utility of using a video camera to maximize situational 
awareness for the incident commander. Although this capability is solely intended to save 
lives, it is likely that some video will unintentionally include private information about 
U.S. persons during the course of the operation; therefore, efforts must be taken to ensure 
any private information is obtained legally. This private information could present itself 
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in the form of people observed during a disaster site reconnaissance, subjects inside a 
location suspected of being contaminated by dangerous CBRN materials, or privately 
owned buildings or property that is considered “U.S. persons.”  
1. Proper Use Memorandum  
Current intelligence oversight policy is robust and capable of supporting domestic 
sUAS operations as long as appropriate measures are taken. There is clear policy 
regarding the use of video from manned aircraft. Deputy SecDef policy memorandum 15-
002 states, “All UAS acquisition, collection, retention, and dissemination of information will 
be in accordance with standing DOD regulations and policy, including DOD Component 
intelligence oversight guidance, and will require a PUM.”107 A proper use memorandum 
(PUM), is a memorandum of request by an organization to conduct domestic imagery while 
acknowledging the “legal and policy” limitations regarding the “collection, retention, 
dissemination, and use” of acquired imagery.108 For National Guard units, the PUM is sent to 
the state intelligence officer (the J2), and then must be reviewed by the state’s judge advocate 
and the inspector general prior to sending to the National Guard Bureau J2 for approval. 
Figure 4 depicts the current process for submitting a PUM, which can be for one-time 
approvals or annual approvals to accommodate repeated training in the same location. It is 
noteworthy that the state’s adjutant general has immediate approval authority for airborne 
domestic imagery collection when time precludes obtaining an approved PUM as long as the 
information collected is a lawful acquisition and that the support is in accordance with the 
Constitution and all applicable policy and guidance.109 
                                                 
107 Deputy Secretary of Defense, Guidance for the Domestic Use.  
108 National Guard Bureau, Chief of the National Guard Manual, E-4.  
109 Ibid.  
 45 
 
Figure 4.  Current Process to Submit a PUM110 
2. The CST and Intelligence Oversight 
The daily operating status of the National Guard (NG) is called the “NG Baseline 
Operating Posture,”111 and the “NG conducts training, planning, and exercises as well as 
domestic operations” while in this posture.112 In general, the goal is to ensure the NG is 
prepared to fulfill its state or federal role if requested as well as to maintain situational 
awareness of the homeland operating environment. Within the baseline operating posture, 
some units are authorized to collect information on non-DOD affiliated persons or 
organizations when performing DSCA activities to “maintain situational awareness and 
detect threats or concerns;” however, there must be a relationship between the 
information collected and the NG unit’s mission and function.113 In the manual, it lists a 
state’s CST as one of the units whose mission authorizes the collection of information of 
non-DOD affiliated persons in support of DSCA operations.114 Once the mission is 
complete, all information regarding U.S. persons must be redacted from any reports.115  
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The retention of collected information can be problematic if not properly 
conducted. Chapter VI proposes control measures to ensure any information collected 
remains in the chain of custody of the supported civil authorities and the system does not 
have organic data retention capability.  
3. Legality of Aerial Domestic Imagery 
Responses to natural disasters and civilian emergencies are generally considered 
legal for domestic imagery.116 A PUM must be on file before domestic imagery can be 
taken from aerial platforms for “the use of IAA platforms, assets, or personnel to collect 
sensor data; the systems, or organizations to analyze sensor data; or the use of sensor data 
for intelligence, intelligence-related, or IAA purposes.”117 This would reasonably include 
air monitoring sensors used to detect CBRN matter. 
One challenge with the DOD intelligence oversight policy is the lack of 
authorization to use sUAS for domestic imagery. This policy gap is discussed in further 
detail in Chapter V.  
D. NATIONAL AIRSPACE SYSTEM INTEGRATION 
The integration of VTOL sUAS into the NAS is a relatively new concept and is 
instrumental to the success of this proposal. Although the FAA recently published 
comprehensive sUAS guidance for private and commercial operators, the guidance does 
not apply to public use; however, the DOD still has to comply with the airspace and 
traffic rules set out in Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91, General 
Operating and Flight Rules.118 The integration of DOD VTOL sUAS into the NAS will 
require innovative solutions and close coordination with the FAA to ensure safe operation 
and compliance with current regulatory guidance. The FAA authorizes the use of DOD 
UAS through a COA or through voluntary compliance with CFR Part 107. A COA is an 
authorization given by the FAA to public agencies to operate sUAS for specific 
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activities.119 The capability discussed in this thesis must be deployable to varying 
locations and cannot be limited to specific activities limited by a COA; therefore, every 
effort should be made to manage this capability in concert with CFR Part 107. This will 
be discussed in more detail in Chapter VI. 
sUAS have two unique characteristics that separate them from manned aircraft 
and define their safety role within the NAS: 1) the ability to “see and avoid” other traffic, 
and 2) operator loss of positive control.120 Currently, commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) 
sUAS are capable of mitigating these risks to an acceptable level, enabling safe 
operations, and they are continuously becoming safer as the technology improves. The 
FAA developed a list of operational limitations in CFR Part 107 in order to address these 
safety issues. Table 1 is an extract from Part 107 and outlines the requirements 
commercial operators must meet to be approved for sUAS operations within the NAS.  
                                                 
119 Federal Aviation Administration, “Certificates of Waiver or Authorization (CAO)” last modified 
August 19, 2016, https://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/ato/
service_units/systemops/aaim/organizations/uas/coa/.  
120 Adapted from: 14 CFR, Part 107.  
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Table 1.   Summary of the Major Provisions of Part 107121 
 
Operational Limitations  
 
Unmanned aircraft must weigh less than 55 lbs. (25 kg).  
Visual line-of-sight (VLOS) only; the unmanned aircraft   must 
remain within VLOS of the remote pilot in command and 
the person manipulating the flight controls of the small 
UAS. Alternatively, the unmanned aircraft must remain 
within VLOS of the visual observer.  
At all times the small unmanned aircraft must remain close 
enough to the remote pilot in command and the person 
manipulating the flight controls of the small UAS for 
those people to be capable of seeing the aircraft with 
vision unaided by any device other than corrective 
lenses.  
Small unmanned aircraft may not operate over any persons 
not directly participating in the operation, not under a 
covered structure, and not inside a covered stationary 
vehicle.  
Daylight-only operations, or civil twilight (30 minutes before 
official sunrise to 30 minutes after official sunset, local 
time) with appropriate anti-collision lighting.  
Must yield right of way to other aircraft.  
May use visual observer (VO) but not required.  
First-person view camera cannot satisfy “see-and-avoid” 
requirement but can be used as long as requirement is 
satisfied in other ways.  
Maximum groundspeed of 100 mph (87 knots).  
Maximum altitude of 400 feet above ground level (AGL) or, if 
higher than 400 feet AGL, remain within 400 feet of a 
structure.  
Minimum weather visibility of 3 miles from control station.  
Operations in Class B, C, D and E airspace are allowed with 
the required ATC permission.  
Operations in Class G airspace are allowed without ATC 
permission.  
No person may act as a remote pilot in command or VO for 
more than one unmanned aircraft operation at one time.  
No operations from a moving aircraft.  
No operations from a moving vehicle unless the operation is 
over a sparsely populated area.  
No careless or reckless operations.  
No carriage of hazardous materials.122 
 
 
                                                 
121 Adapted from: 14 CFR, Part 107.  
122 14 CFR, Part 107, 10.  
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The requirements contained in Table 1 provide useful control measures that could 
be readily applied to DOD operations and remain within the scope of this proposal. These 
control measures would ensure DOD operations are executed in concert with FAA 
regulatory requirements. The uniqueness and immediacy of the DOD mission create 
additional challenges for operations.   
1. FAA Mission Approval 
The nature of the CST mission would require a near immediate approval 
mechanism from the FAA to deploy the asset in a timely manner. Events requiring this 
capability occur without warning and do not provide sufficient time to plan and submit 
for approval to deploy resources. First responders must establish situational awareness 
immediately following a disaster; however, many disasters occur in populated areas with 
a commercial airport nearby. Commercial airports are accompanied by controlled 
airspace, which necessitates coordination with the local air traffic control tower prior to 
sUAS deployment. The DOD and the FAA could develop an agreement that provides a 
framework for immediate approval of sUAS deployment within controlled airspace. 
Furthermore, CSTs must also be prepared to utilize alternate resources if the FAA denies 
approval due to high traffic congestion in the area or due to any other safety concerns.  
2. Airspace Violations  
Airspace violations are a very serious issue with manned aircraft. The FAA has 
the authority to remove an airmen’s certification at any time for flight violations 
compromising safety. Since the FAA has no authority over DOD operations, there should 
be mechanisms in place to ensure operators who violate the approved parameters are held 
accountable for any deviations during the operation of the mission. These mechanisms 
could include suspension or revocation of the operator’s certification based on the 
severity of the violation. In addition, reports should be submitted through the local FAA 
Flight Standardization District Office (FSDO) and forwarded to the military chain of 
command. Standardized operator training and sUAS with programmed flight parameter 
limitations will be instrumental to the success of the program and will help mitigate the 
risk of deviation from the authorized parameters contained in Part 107. Training is 
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discussed in detail in Chapter V. Additionally, flight profile tracking mechanisms could 
be implemented to monitor factors such as altitude, airspeed, and geographic location 
tracking in order to ensure the sUAS is being used in accordance with regulatory 
guidelines.  
E. ARMY MISSION APPROVAL POLICY 
Current policy outlines the mission approval process for Army sUAS. The process 
is three tiered and is intended to ensure all policies and regulatory guidance are followed 
and all risks are identified and mitigated from the initial receipt of a mission to mission 
completion.123 The three tiers always involve the chain of command, apply to every 
flight, and cannot be circumvented or delegated.  A commander in the grade of O-5 or 
above must identify qualified personnel to perform the duties within each tier.124 The 
levels of approval are outlined in AR 95-23 as:125 
1. Initial Mission Approval Authority  
This is the first level of approval. The commander or his/her designated 
representative evaluates the legality and feasibility and either accepts or rejects the 
mission. 
2. Briefing Officer or Noncommissioned Officer   
Briefing officers/ noncommissioned officers (NCOs) need to be designated in 
writing by the commander to identify, assess, and mitigate sUAS risk. The commander 
selects briefing officers/NCOs based on their “level of experience, maturity, judgment, 
and their ability to effectively mitigate risk.”126 This individual is responsible for 
verifying crew qualifications/currency, weather, accuracy of paperwork, and any other 
factors considered prior to deployment of the sUAS. 
                                                 
123 Department of the Army, Rapid Action Revision.  
124 Ibid.  
125 Ibid.  
126 Ibid.  
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3. Final Mission Approval Authority  
The final mission approval authority (FAA) is the ultimate approval authority for 
all missions. The FAA is always a member of the chain of command and approves the 
mission based on a risk value generated by the operator and briefing officer/NCO. 
Missions with higher risk require a higher level of approval authority, whereas low risk 
missions may only require a lower level of approval. The FAA can only approve 
missions based on the level of risk it is approved to accept.   
F. RISK ASSESSMENT  
Current Army policy requires a risk assessment worksheet for every manned or 
unmanned flight. This policy is easily replicated and could be readily integrated into any 
new sUAS program. The worksheet is a compilation of factors such as crew rest, 
weather, complexity of the mission, proficiency of the crew, and any other factors the 
commander deems important. Each risk is assigned a risk value and then these are 
compiled at the end of the worksheet. The resultant number falls into one of several 
different categories that now define the level of risk. For example, the normal risk levels 
are low, medium, high, and extremely high. An individual of lower rank can usually 
approve a low risk mission, whereas a high-risk mission may require a general officer to 
approve. For example, a flight in uncontrolled airspace in a sparsely populated town may 
be considered a low risk mission and could be approved by lower level of authority, but a 
damage assessment in the middle of a large city with a busy airport in the vicinity may 
require approval from the unit commander. The goal of the operator is to determine an 
initial risk and then explore ways to mitigate that risk to a lower level. If the risk cannot 
be mitigated, the mission must be approved by the appropriate level of approval 
authority.  
G. ACQUISITION AND USE  
Integrating a new technology into the Army procurement system can be a 
complex, expensive, and time-consuming process. This particular proposal involves a 
lightweight, inexpensive sUAS that can be procured commercially. Additionally, this 
could be a low-density fielding since less than 60 aircraft would be in the field at any 
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time. An analysis of Army policy identified an avenue that could streamline acquisition 
and use of a nonstandard UAS. Nonstandard UAS include “trainers, prototype, test bed, 
and UAS procured in such a low density that treating them as standard UASs would 
create a burden to the system.”127 Acquisition of nonstandard UAS is authorized only 
when standard aircraft cannot accomplish the mission.128 The mission discussed in this 
thesis cannot be completed with standard Army unmanned aircraft systems because they 
lack VTOL capability. Additionally, the acquisition of nonstandard aircraft is beneficial 
to unit commanders because it provides them greater flexibility to develop their own 
flying hour program.129 Finally, nonstandard aircraft allow the commander to establish a 
sUAS training program that does not hinder the rest of the CST mission.  
This sUAS capability may not generate additional force structure to accommodate 
sUAS operators; therefore, operator duties may be assigned to personnel as an addition to 
their assigned role within the team. A robust training program that mirrors standard UAS 
training policy could be overwhelming for a small team due to the extensive training 
requirements for all existing CST personnel; however, the existing training program 
framework could be useful for developing new sUAS training policy. The next step in 
this research is identifying gaps in existing policy and doctrine. A recommended training 




                                                 
127 Ibid., 25.  
128 Ibid., 25.  
129 Ibid., 27.  
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V. GAP ANALYSIS OF CURRENT DOD UAS POLICY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapters explored current policies and protocol for response to 
WMD and HAZMAT events requiring CST assistance, and they discussed considerations 
such as responder safety, standoff distance, and CST capabilities. Additionally, an 
analysis of current DOD policy regarding the use of UAS provided insight into how the 
framework of existing policy can be used to support new technology with the 
introduction of sUAS. This chapter addresses the gaps in current response protocol as 
well as gaps in current DOD policy regarding the use of sUAS within the homeland. 
Although there is a foundational framework, significant gaps present policy challenges 
and require revision of existing doctrine to be successful.  
The intent of this response protocol gap analysis is not to suggest that current 
TTPs are insufficient but rather to identify opportunities to improve responder safety by 
maximizing standoff distance for personnel from a dangerous environment. Additionally, 
the gap analysis examines how incident situational awareness can be greatly improved by 
the adoption of emerging technology to provide greater decision-making capabilities to 
civil authorities.  
Existing DOD policy is sufficient to support current capabilities. However, this 
proposal involves technology that does not yet exist; therefore, requires policy revision. 
The DOD’s domestic large UAS program is intended only to provide UAS as a last resort 
in support of civil authorities, and it is not conducive to immediate activation. 
Additionally, the integration of DOD sUAS into the NAS without a COA has not been 
addressed. This chapter explores possibilities that could bridge the gap between what the 
FAA has implemented and what could work for the DOD. 
Finally, the relationship between DOD sUAS operations and local/state legislation 
must be congruent. Some states have passed restrictive drone legislation that requires 
careful review prior to implementing this proposal. The DOD will have to evaluate state 
and local laws to ensure the sUAS are used in accordance with local and state laws.  
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B. RESPONSE PROTOCOL 
Current response protocol has proven safe when used properly but the addition of 
sUAS could greatly improve safety by increasing responder standoff distance as well as 
providing valuable information to responders prior to entry. Currently, civil authorities 
use available resources on scene to develop the situation and make response decisions. 
Their available resources could include eyewitnesses and visible cues such as smoke or 
structure damage or personnel who are able to enter the incident area and make an 
assessment the situation. Some first response agencies have unmanned ground vehicles 
capable of maneuvering into a potentially dangerous situation and transmitting video 
back to the IC, but not only are these vehicles are limited in what they can observe from 
the ground, they are susceptible to obstacles.  
Current HAZMAT protocol requires personnel to don appropriate PPE and enter a 
potential contamination zone with appropriate equipment to conduct operations. This 
process is time consuming and puts personnel in a potentially unsafe situation. Prior to 
entry, there is a considerable amount of coordination and preparation that must be 
completed. Personnel must conduct entry briefings, prepare and inspect their equipment, 
and don PPE. Moreover, a typical CBRN or HAZMAT response involves multiple 
personnel responsible for various tasks. Personnel entering a potentially contaminated 
area must have backup personnel on standby as well as personnel prepared to conduct 
decontamination operations. Additionally, there must be medical staff on site that can 
attend to injuries or other medical issues. Personnel numbers may be adjusted based on 
the type of threat. The ability to develop a comprehensive understanding of the threat 
prior entry could result in mitigated risk and more informed decision making. 
A sUAS aerial platform capable of transmitting live video as well as CBRN 
sensor data could provide civil authorities with invaluable information regarding an 
incident. This technology could be deployed almost immediately while response teams 
are preparing for entry. In addition, it could quickly map the area with monitoring 
equipment as well as video cameras. A sUAS could also look in windows of structures to 
search for potential casualties or other clues to help understand the situation inside. This 
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capability would not replace personnel; rather, it would complement personnel and 
provide valuable information allowing responders to make better informed decisions.   
C. LACK OF DOMESTIC SUAS POLICY 
Gaps in existing DOD UAS policy must be identified and addressed to 
accommodate sUAS. These gaps exist because domestic VTOL sUAS do not exist in 
current framework and must be integrated into new or existing policy.  
1. No Domestic sUAS Guidance  
DEPSECDEF UAS policy memorandum 15-002 does not address sUAS.130 The 
memorandum reflects a compilation of policy and regulatory information from other 
documents that is compiled into one memorandum, and it was written to provide 
guidance on the domestic use of UAS, not sUAS. The DOD recognizes that UAS can 
provide invaluable assistance to civil authorities during disaster response, and it has made 
efforts to support the integration of these resources into state emergency plans. 
Acceptance of this proposal could generate revision of the policy memorandum and 
associated regulatory documents acknowledging the use of sUAS in support of 
immediate civil authority response missions.  
2. Mission Approval Authority  
Current policy retains UAS approval authority at the SecDef level.131 This is to 
ensure that any domestic use of military UAS is given the highest level of approval due to 
the public sensitivity of military operations in the homeland. In the event of a major 
disaster, this approval process can be completed in a relatively short amount of time, but 
it is not conducive to supporting first responders, whose need for support is determined in 
minutes, not hours or even days. This sUAS proposal involves a much smaller, less 
expensive, and less intruding capability. Mission success depends on the ability to assist 
civil authorities immediately, and approval must be delegated to the lowest level possible 
to accommodate rapid response. Additionally, the current policy memorandum 
                                                 
130 Deputy Secretary of Defense, Guidance for the Domestic Use.  
131 Ibid., 3.  
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specifically prohibits DOD UAS from supporting “federal, state, or local immediate 
response.”132 This prohibition is likely the result of concern about using DOD 
surveillance assets in support of civil authorities without appropriate approval. The 
capabilities and mission sets for a sUAS would be minimal and should not generate the 
same level of concern for the DOD.  
3. Doctrine  
New sUAS technology necessitates new employment doctrine. New doctrine 
should focus on the differences between traditional Army sUAS overseas employment 
considerations and the non-traditional (domestic) considerations. New challenges in 
domestic sUAS employment include having a thorough understanding of intelligence 
oversight and how it relates to the collection, dissemination, and retention of information 
on U.S. persons. Additional challenges include understanding airspace rules and 
regulations. Currently, Army doctrine restricts unmanned aircraft system use to special 
use airspace unless the flight is conducted within the parameters of a COA.133 This 
proposal involves sUAS whose missions will occur inside controlled airspace in the 
vicinity of civil aircraft and require direct coordination with an FAA air traffic control 
tower. Finally, the capabilities and mission sets for VTOL aircraft are distinctly different 
than fixed wing aircraft and require different employment doctrine. For example, the 
ability to hover and fly at slow airspeeds enables VTOL aircraft to operate in situations 
that might otherwise pose a safety hazard to low-flying fixed wing aircraft. Some 
situations that could benefit from a VTOL aircraft include operations in confined areas, 
urban settings in which line of sight may be quickly lost by fast-moving aircraft, 
operations in close proximity to structures/windows, and operations during which a 
sustained view of a stationary target is necessary, such as with a suspicious package or 
other potential WMD device. 
                                                 
132 Ibid., 2.  
133 Ibid., 16.  
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4. Training  
Current UAS training manuals are intended for more complex fixed wing aircraft 
and are focused on overseas missions. For example, operators are required to become 
proficient at tasks that pertain to surveillance, gunnery, target tracking, radio operating 
procedures, and many other tasks that would not necessarily pertain to a domestic VTOL 
platform.134 Existing Army UAS doctrine requires operators to be proficient at 30 tasks 
outlined in their Aircrew Training Manual.135 The intent of this proposal is to 
recommend an operator-friendly capability that utilizes a training program focused on 
effective operation of essential sUAS tasks only.  
D. NATIONAL AIRSPACE INTEGRATION 
Chapter IV explored the existing framework for civil sUAS integration into the 
NAS. Current DOD UAS/sUAS airspace integration policy is not written to 
accommodate domestic operations. The DOD and the FAA signed the most recent 
airspace agreement in 2013.136 This memorandum of agreement (MOA) applied to all 
DOD UAS specifically listed by nomenclature at the time,137 and it authorized DOD 
UAS operations in civil airspace outside of restricted, warning, or prohibited areas as 
long as operations were conducted within certain parameters.138 Prior to this MOA, the 
only approved process for flying UAS outside special use airspace at the time was via a 
COA.139 The FAA issues COAs for specific operations, and they must be periodically 
renewed or they expire. It is a method for the FAA to ensure it is able to deconflict 
manned traffic with unmanned traffic and maintain safety at all times. However, this 
time-consuming process is not feasible for this proposed use of sUAS. Unlike units that 
can plan their flights months in advance, CST-operated sUAS must be deployable 
                                                 
134 Department of the Army, UAS Commander’s Guide, A-3.  
135 Ibid.  
136 Department of Defense and Federal Aviation Administration, Memorandum of Agreement, 2.  
137 Ibid., 6.  
138 Ibid., 1.  
139 Ibid., 2.  
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anytime, anywhere. Recent FAA guidance provides a useful framework that could bridge 
the gap between the current DOD policy and immediate launch capability. 
The FAA approved Part 107 of the Federal Aviation Regulations in June 2016. 
Part 107 establishes rules for the use of sUAS within the NAS. This rulemaking does not 
apply to the DOD, but DOD could readily adopt relevant rules set forth by the FAA and 
integrate them into a comprehensive policy to fulfill the requirements of sUAS capability.   
E. STATE AND LOCAL LEGISLATION 
In 2014 and 2015, 36 states passed 45 laws involving drones/sUAS.140 These 
laws range from prohibiting the use of drones for hunting to prohibiting the use of drones 
by law enforcement without a warrant except in emergencies. The DOD must consider 
specific state and local legislation when determining the authorized uses of sUAS and 
ensure DOD policies run parallel with civil legislation. As regulation varies between 
states, it may require additional restrictions in certain locations. For example, Part 107 
does not include a general preemption clause; this means local and state legislation has 
legal authority over the federal rulemaking.141 This conflict could become problematic 
when a federally funded agency, such as the National Guard, attempts to employ sUAS in 
states with restrictive legislation. The FAA considers preemption requests on a case-by-
case basis only.142 Each state with sUAS legislation has an exception for emergencies, 
and the DOD could likely use this contingency to find a workable solution. There is no 
state legislation to date outright prohibiting the use of sUAS. The most restrictive 
legislation involves the use of sUAS by law enforcement agencies. Chapter VI discusses 
the policy proposal and provide recommendations to policy and doctrine. 
 
 
                                                 
140 National Conference of State Legislatures, “Current Unmanned Aircraft State Law Landscape,” 
October 7, 2016, http://www.ncsl.org/research/transportation/current-unmanned-aircraft-
state-law-landscape.aspx.  
14 CFR, Part 107, 228.  
142 Ibid.  
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VI. SUMMARY OF BENEFITS, CONCLUSION, AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS  
A. INTRODUCTION 
sUAS could be valuable tools for emergency responders for rapid response 
and gaining invaluable situational awareness before responding to and 
engaging in potentially dangerous operations.  
Representative for the Department of Homeland Security Robotic Aircraft for 
Safety (RAPS) Project143 
 
The previous chapters sought to define the National Guard’s CSTs and their role 
as the DOD’s first response to civil authorities in support of natural and manmade 
disasters. These chapters also discussed the daily WMD and HAZMAT threats the 
country faces and how a CST is an ideal response unit tailored to meeting the needs of 
communities during these events. Current technological challenges limit an incident 
commander’s ability to quickly and accurately assess the situation without dispatching 
response personnel into a potentially unsafe environment. Emerging technology provides 
an opportunity to improve safety and increase situational awareness for civil authorities.  
Part of a CST’s mission is to “support civil authorities at domestic incident sites 
during specified events,” such as during:  
• The use or threatened use of WMD. 
• A terrorist attack or threatened attack in the United States that results, or 
could result, in catastrophic loss of life or property. 
• The intentional or unintentional release of nuclear, biological, 
radiological, or toxic or poisonous materials in the U.S. that results, or 
could result, in catastrophic loss of life or property. 
• A natural or manmade disaster in the U.S. that results, or could result, in 
catastrophic loss of life or property.”144  
                                                 
143 Department of Homeland Security, Privacy Impact Assessment, 2.  
144 Department of the Army, Weapons of Mass Destruction, 4-1.  
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This mission can be vastly improved with emerging sUAS technology, which can 
enhance the CSTs’ ability to detect and identify CBRN agents and substances as well as 
to provide critical visual information regarding the incident site prior to personnel 
deployment. A CST is an ideal unit to operate this capability due to CSTs’ presence in 
each state and territory and because they are the only National Guard resource that does 
not require reimbursement from the requesting agency.  
B. CONCLUSION  
sUAS is a transformational capability that can change the way civil authorities 
respond to many incidents. Whether intentional or unintentional CBRN/HAZMAT events 
or natural disasters, the integration of sUAS has the potential to save lives by improving 
situational awareness for incident commanders and increasing standoff distance for 
response personnel. The ability to detect and identify hazardous airborne matter without 
endangering personnel is invaluable. Additionally, the ability to conduct an aerial 
reconnaissance with a sUAS would give civil authorities a multi-dimensional perspective 
of an incident site, enabling them to formulate a more informed response plan and 
potentially save additional lives. CSTs are the ideal organizations to implement this 
technology for multiple reasons, including their mission as an all hazards response 
organization, highly trained personnel, WMD/CBRN expertise, its strategic locations 
throughout the United States and territories, continuous availability, and a CST is 
provided at no cost to the requesting agency.  
This research proves that the technology provided by sUAS platforms is an ideal 
step to meeting national strategic guidance to continuously improve CBRN response in 
the homeland as well as to address key initiatives outlined in the 2010 QDR. These 
initiatives are: 1) Field faster, more flexible consequence management response forces, 2) 
Enhance capabilities for domain awareness, and 3) Accelerate the development of 
standoff radiological/nuclear detection capabilities.  
Analysis of existing policy and doctrine demonstrates that there is a sufficient 
policy framework to support VTOL sUAS; however, there are gaps in the policy that 
must be addressed. This thesis identifies those gaps and provides recommendations for 
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solutions. CFR Part 107 provides a valuable framework for integration of sUAS into the 
national airspace system. While Part 107 does not address DOD operations, research 
suggests that the DOD could adopt Part 107 with minimal changes. This would eliminate 
the need to develop a new, separate policy agreement, such as an MOU or COA between 
the FAA and the DOD.  
Existing intelligence oversight doctrine is sufficient to support sUAS operations; 
however, policy must be revised to address sUAS. The gap between doctrine and policy 
is relatively simple to overcome. Current policy regarding intelligence oversight 
considerations for “airborne platforms” conducting domestic imagery is clear, as is policy 
for large (tactical) unmanned aircraft systems.145 The term “airborne platforms” refers to 
manned aircraft. UAS capabilities discussed in this thesis are more closely related to 
airborne platform capabilities than large unmanned capabilities. This is because large 
UAS policy is written with regard to imagery taken from aircraft with “weapon system 
video and tactical intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities.”146 Since 
sUAS is not a weapon system, policy should reflect similar requirements as the airborne 
platform. The critical requirement for all imagery taken from an airborne platform is a 
PUM. The PUM can be approved in a short amount of time during a disaster and can be 
approved in advance provided operations remain within the parameters listed in the 
PUM.  
The benefits of sUAS as discussed in this proposal include safety, increased 
situational awareness, reasonable cost, and they are an immediately available nationwide 
resource.  
1. Safety  
Life safety is the primary objective during any response, and any technology that 
can improve life safety should be explored.147 sUAS technology improves safety by 
increasing the initial standoff distance for responders and providing them with critical 
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visual and air quality data prior to deployment. When using an sUAS that provides both 
video and CBRN detection, the response personnel could enter the environment with a 
more comprehensive understanding of the situation.  
2. Increased Situational Awareness 
An incident commander’s ability to gain information about a situation is key to 
response plan development. This proposal highlights new sUAS technology that could 
simplify and transform the amount of information available to decision makers without 
risking the safety of response personnel. Missions such as damage assessment, CBRN 
detection and identification, site reconnaissance, and site characterization could be 
accomplished quickly and provide invaluable information to an incident commander. The 
result would be quicker, more efficient response with more appropriate resources while 
placing fewer personnel at risk.   
3. Cost  
Specific sUAS and their cost were not in the scope of this research because exact 
appropriate sUAS specifications are not known at this time; however, capabilities should 
include: stabilized high definition (HD) video, long-range video transmission, long 
battery life, and payload capability for CBRN monitors. The cost of a sUAS equipped 
with secure transmission capability and CBRN detection would be more expensive than 
standard sUAS, but it would still be much less expensive than manned platforms. For 
example, a UH-72A helicopter equipped with video downlink used to conduct IAA costs 
$2,826 per hour,148 and that cost does not include personnel. The goal of sUAS 
procurement should also be to find a system that is easily replaceable when damaged or 
contaminated. Cost and availability of remote, portable CBRN monitoring equipment that 
could be carried by a sUAS was outside the scope of this research, though it will likely 
cost more than the sUAS itself. 
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4. Immediate Nationwide Resource  
The role of CSTs in homeland security is to act as subject matter experts for 
WMD response and to be able to respond to any incident 24 hours a day, 365 days a year, 
anywhere in the United States and its territories. In addition to being located throughout 
the country, the CSTs maintain the same standards, are all equipped with the same 
number of personnel, and have the same capabilities. This standardization differs from 
local first response agencies because their capabilities are based upon their budget and 
priorities of the locally elected officials. Some agencies may have the resources to 
support a sUAS program while other agencies may not. The use of sUAS by CSTs would 
provide a standard capability that would be available to every community in the country.  
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Based on the research in this thesis, the following are offered as recommendations 
for sUAS acquisition and establishing new sUAS operating policies. 
1. sUAS Capabilities 
The following sUAS capability recommendations reflect equal or more restrictive 
measures that those outlined in Part 107. This will enable DOD sUAS to be integrated 
within an established framework.  
a. Size and Operational Limitations 
Ideally, a sUAS used by CST would weigh no more than 50 pounds, including 
payload. The DOD UAS size classification published by the Chair of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff (CJCS) in 2011 classifies this type of UAS as a Group 2 UA, meaning it weighs 
between 21 and 50 pounds and normally operates at altitudes less than 3500 feet (’) 
above ground level (AGL) and less than 250 knots airspeed.149 sUAS speed and altitude 
should be limited to the maximum airspeed and altitude established in CFR Part 107—30 
knots airspeed and 400’ AGL.150 The CJCS classification also dictates the minimum 
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training that all operators must accomplish based on the size of the UAS. This will be 
discussed below.  
b. Equipment  
Based on the mission requirements, the sUAS should be configurable with or 
without CBRN monitoring equipment. Monitoring equipment should be small enough to 
be effective yet not interfere with the flight characteristics of the sUAS. Ideally, the 
monitoring equipment should be able to transmit air sample data to the operator in real 
time so the system does not have to be decontaminated when it returns if it has negative 
results. The video camera should have high resolution and zoom capability as well as the 
ability to transmit a secure signal to the operator. The security of the transmission is 
important to satisfy intelligence oversight requirements and ensure no private information 
on U.S. persons is obtained from unauthorized sources.  
c. Recording Capability  
The receiver should be outfitted with the ability to accept an external storage 
device and the ability to record information gathered by the sUAS should be limited to 
external media devices only. In addition, the chain of custody should remain with the 
supported agency. This will prevent possible intelligence oversight conflicts and protect 
the DOD if the recorded imagery is used as evidence during civil or legal litigation.  
2. Policy 
DEPSECDEF Policy Memorandum 15-002 is an all-inclusive document for DOD 
policy regarding the domestic use of sUAS. This policy is not intended to address sUAS. 
The policy was intended to allow governors the flexibility to incorporate large UAS into 
their state emergency plans and request these resources during a disaster. Additionally, 
this policy memorandum is ill-suited to provide guidance for the domestic use of large 
UAS and small UAS congruently.151 The two systems have vastly different missions and 
                                                 
151 Deputy Secretary of Defense, Guidance for the Domestic Use. 
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operate in different airspace. DOD VTOL sUAS should be treated the same as civil 
sUAS and a new, specific sUAS DOD policy is needed.  
A working group should be appointed to review current policy and develop 
recommendations that accommodate new sUAS policy. This working group should be 
comprised of staffers and planners from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), 
the National Guard Bureau (NGB), subject matter experts from the field who represent 
the CSTs, as well as representatives from state and local fire agencies to determine the 
requirements for a functional mission set. The working group should analyze approved 
missions and doctrine and training.  
3. Approved Missions  
As stated in Chapter IV, there are only five approved missions for domestic UAS: 
1) DOD operations, 2) state/National Guard operations, 3) search and rescue, 4) DOD-
required exercises, and 5) training, and exercises, training, and activities not required by 
the DOD. sUAS used in support of civil authorities should be a separate mission in this 
policy or addressed in a separate policy altogether.  
a. Approval Authority  
Current approval authority for each domestic UAS flight is the SecDef; search 
and rescue is the only exception.152 The mission set for this sUAS will necessitate 
immediate deployment and the current level of approval is time consuming. The existing 
approval authority policy works in the current framework because large UAS are not 
intended to support DSCA missions. Even so, the DOD recognizes the value of their 
technology and is willing to allow them to be used on a case-by-case basis during 
emergency situations. These situations afford ample time to request approval from the 
SecDef. The primary purpose of sUAS is to support civil authorities, and the parameters 
for use should already be established; therefore, the approval authority should be 
authorized within the CST command.  
                                                 
152 Ibid. 
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b. Currently Approved IAA Capabilities  
Most issues discussed in this thesis are currently addressed by similar programs 
within the DOD. The sUAS technology is new but the IAA mission is not. There are 
current programs to perform the IAA mission with different equipment; sUAS are not 
significantly different. One example of a similar capability is the unmanned ground 
vehicle provided to some CSTs. These UGVs are capable of providing the same 
information to civil authorities, but they are slow and restricted to ground operations. The 
sUAS simply improves that capability by adding the ability to collect information from 
the air. Additionally, manned aircraft currently conduct IAA. Many helicopters and fixed 
wing aircraft are equipped with video downlink capability as well as CBRN sensors. 
sUAS would not utilize any capabilities that do not already exist other than the aircraft 
itself. 
4. Doctrine and Training  
New doctrine and training guidance must be developed prior to implementation. 
sUAS doctrine can include training guidance, intelligence oversight, and elements from 
AR 95-23.  
a. Training Guidance  
The sUAS needs new Unmanned Aircraft System Commander’s Guide and 
Aircrew Training Manual (ATM). Every Army aircraft has an ATM to provide guidance 
to the commander about how to build a training program and maintain crew proficiency. 
VTOL sUAS is a vastly different aircraft than a fixed wing sUAS and requires its own 
training program. This thesis recommends developing a simple training program based on 
the capabilities and mission parameters of the sUAS. In addition, flight tasks and 
academic knowledge requirements should be limited to those who are relevant to the 
mission. For example, important academic topics may include: airspace rules, 
intelligence oversight considerations and PUM process, lost link procedures, weather 
effects on sUAS operations, operational considerations, crew member qualifications, and 
flight characteristics. Important flight tasks should focus on aircraft control, emergency 
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procedures, and TTPs that are specific to the mission, such as how to conduct air 
monitoring/sampling and video downlink.  
CJCSI 3255.01 addresses the joint use of unmanned aircraft systems. This 
instruction is intended to establish minimum training standards for UAS operations in 
support of joint forces.153 Although this document is intended to provide guidance for 
tactical assets, it provides a useful framework for establishing training standards based on 
system weights and capabilities. For example, operators of heavier, faster aircraft must 
meet different training standards than operators of smaller, slower aircraft. The document 
establishes minimum training topics that must be discussed for all UAS operators, 
regardless of the aircraft used. Some of these topics may be irrelevant to sUAS 
operations, but CJCSI 3255.01 could still be used as a framework for developing a 
training program. Key points include: 
“(1) Airspace design and operating requirements 
(2) Air traffic control procedures, rules, and regulations 
(3) Aerodynamics, including effects of controls 




(8) Communication procedures 
(9) Mission preparation”154 
b. Intelligence Oversight  
Current DOD IO policy is nested in a range of policy and doctrinal documents. 
The primary challenge is that current IO policy does not recognize sUAS capability 
because a VTOL sUAS capability does not yet exist. In addition, current IO UAS policy 
is written for the use of large, tactical UAS rather than VTOL sUAS. This thesis 
recommends that sUAS and large UAS be treated as separate aircraft in DOD manuals 
                                                 
153 Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 4. 
154 Ibid., A-2.  
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and policy documents. For example, CNGBM 2000.01 currently authorizes the use of 
domestic imagery in support of DSCA operations by airborne platforms as long as a 
PUM is on file.155 The same regulation later states, “NG UAS assets will NOT be 
employed for DSCA purposes without specific SecDef approval.”156 The section in 
CNGBM 2000.01 discussing UAS is written to address “tactical” capabilities. The sUAS 
discussed in this thesis is not a tactical asset and should be authorized to collect imagery 
under the “aerial platform,” subsection of CNGBM 2000.01. The proper use 
memorandum request process provides a useful framework for ensuring the rights of U.S. 
persons are maintained. Figure 5 is an example of a useful decision matrix that could be 
used to determine the need for a PUM prior to mission execution.  
 
Figure 5.  Is a PUM Required?157  
                                                 
155 National Guard Bureau, Chief of the National Guard Manual, E-2.  
156 Ibid., E-3.  
157 Source: National Guard Bureau, Chief of the National Guard Manual, E-7.  
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c. Army Regulation 95-23 Unmanned Aircraft System Flight Regulations  
Regulation 95-23 Unmanned Aircraft System Flight Regulations currently does 
not address VTOL aircraft. Although the framework of AR 95-23 is an excellent resource 
for a comprehensive aviation program, it is written for fixed wing UAS and is too 
onerous for a simplistic system operating at slow airspeeds and low altitudes. This thesis 
recommends a new AR that addresses VTOL aircraft and simplifies training and 
qualification requirements or adding a new chapter to AR 95-23. Some features of the 
AR 95-23 should be adopted into the sUAS program, features such as the mission 
approval process, risk assessment, guidance for crew member evaluations, and flight 
maneuver task, condition, and standards.  
5. National Airspace Integration 
The FAA published FAR Part 107 to govern the operation of private and 
commercial sUAS. This rulemaking offers workable solutions to DOD sUAS operations 
and ensures the safety of bystanders as well as other manned aircraft. The DOD should 
adopt the operational limitations as outlined in Part 107 with minor changes. This will 
eliminate the need for a COA. Table 2 parallels Part 107 but is more restrictive in several 
respects. First, it considerably reduces the airspeed limit from 100 knots to 35 knots 
groundspeed. Second, it reduces the max weight from 55 pound to 50 pounds. Third, this 
proposal mandates the use of a visual observer when the video camera or air monitoring 
equipment is in use. The authorization to carry hazardous materials is less restrictive in 
this figure because the nature of the mission may require the aircraft to carry samples of 
hazardous materials; however, the aircraft should always remain within the perimeter of 
the established contamination zone where appropriately protected personnel can recover 
the samples and decontaminate the aircraft.  
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Table 2.   Summary of the Modified Major Provisions of Part 107158 
 
 Operational Limitations  
 
 
Unmanned aircraft must weigh less than 50 lbs. (22.6 kg).  
Visual line-of-sight (VLOS) only; the unmanned aircraft   must 
remain within VLOS of the remote pilot in command 
and the person manipulating the flight controls of the 
small UAS. Alternatively, the unmanned aircraft must 
remain within VLOS of the visual observer.  
At all times the small unmanned aircraft must remain close 
enough to the remote pilot in command and the person 
manipulating the flight controls of the small UAS for 
those people to be capable of seeing the aircraft with 
vision unaided by any device other than corrective 
lenses.  
Small unmanned aircraft may not operate over any persons 
not directly participating in the operation, not under a 
covered structure, and not inside a covered stationary 
vehicle.  
Daylight-only operations, or civil twilight (30 minutes before 
official sunrise to 30 minutes after official sunset, local 
time) with appropriate anti-collision lighting.  
Must yield right of way to other aircraft.  
Must use visual observer (VO) when the video camera or air 
monitoring equipment is in use.  
First-person view camera cannot satisfy “see-and-avoid” 
requirement but can be used as long as requirement is 
satisfied in other ways.  
Maximum groundspeed of 35 mph (30 knots).  
Maximum altitude of 400 feet above ground level (AGL).  
Minimum weather visibility of 3 miles from control station.  
Operations in Class B, C, D and E airspace are allowed with 
the required ATC permission.  
Operations in Class G airspace are allowed without ATC 
permission.  
No person may act as a remote pilot in command or VO for 
more than one unmanned aircraft operation at one 
time.  
No operations from a moving vehicle unless the operation is 
over a sparsely populated area.  
No careless or reckless operations.  
No carriage of hazardous materials. Carriage of hazardous 
materials is authorized in emergency circumstances and 
must remain inside a controlled area capable of handling 
such materials. 
External load operations are allowed if the object being 
carried by the unmanned aircraft is securely attached 
and does not adversely affect the flight characteristics 
or controllability of the aircraft.159 
 
 
                                                 
158 Adapted from: 14 CFR, Part 107.  
159 14 CFR, Part 107, 10.  
 71 
6. Capability Name 
Finally, this thesis proposes a name for this technology. The WMD Aerial 
Awareness System, Pilotless, or WAASP. This name embodies the mission set of the 
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